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CHAPTER 1: DISSERTATION INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Resources are at the heart of the most heated discussions within a firm, taking priority 
in the strategic thinking of top management teams. Resources are not only a lever through which 
sub-entities within a firm are rewarded and punished, but a lever with which they gain influence 
within the firm (Andersson et al., 2002, Mudambi and Navarra, 2004). A subunit obtains this 
influence by aiding the Multinational Corporation (MNC) in managing external dependencies. 
In relationships of economic exchange, dependencies create situations of uncertainty that 
subject the MNC to capricious actions from counterparties (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The 
ability to handle uncertainty is paramount to a firm’s long-term success, but necessitates an 
accurate understanding of the environment in which the firm operates; that is because a 
prerequisite for dealing with environmental uncertainty is controlling resources within that 
environment (Knight, 1921; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Thus, the extent to which a firm is 
able to deal with uncertainty, through resource control, is a function of the extent to which it 
can form accurate assessments or estimates of its uncertain environment.  
As such, the overarching focus of this dissertation project is on how organizations use 
resources to handle uncertainty, the various ramifications thereof, and how attempts to deal 
with uncertainty are limited by bounded rationality which force tradeoffs. Each dissertation 
paper will tackle a different ramification, and present it as the result of bounded rationality 
expressed in varied, yet connected, ways that demonstrate tradeoffs for organizations. While at 
first glance they may seem to have little in common, two theories employed in this dissertation 
are in fact similar in how they approach the topic of organizations employing resources to 
manage uncertainty: Pfeffer and Salancik’s resource dependence theory and Knight’s theory of 
profit.  
 Dissertation Introduction 
iv 
 
Pfeffer and Salancik’s inquiry focused on resource dependence theory (RDT) which 
says that, within relationships of economic exchange, those who control critical and scarce 
resources on which others rely will hold influence/power over them (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). Holding influence over someone in a relationship of economic exchange is tantamount 
to reducing one’s uncertainty, which is the degree to which future states of the world cannot be 
anticipated and accurately predicted (Pfeffer, 2003).  
As the MNC can be considered an interorganizational network consisting of a HQ and 
locally embedded subsidiaries (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2011; Ghoshal and Bartlett, 
1990), RDT is helpful in understanding relationships within the organization (Herbert, 1984). 
The local environment provides the focal subunit with strategic resources (Andersson et al., 
2007; Forsgren et al., 1999; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1997) that are transferred back to the MNC 
where they are leveraged to build distinct capabilities to best compete (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 
1989; Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Doz and Prahalad, 1984). This is consistent with the notion 
that an MNC’s competitive advantage is likely to stem from intangible firm-specific knowledge 
that is value-adding (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2006; Spender, 1996). With HQs facing 
inherent problems in linking to subsidiary local business environments, a subsidiary’s exclusive 
linkage to its external environment is a source of power that is, in fact, considered rather 
sustainable (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2011).  
In the view of RDT, organizational survival depends critically on an accurate 
assessment of the environment in which the organization operates. However, the theory also 
holds that organizations face complexity emanating from the conflicting and impinging 
demands of its manifold relationships in the external environment. As such, these assessments 
can become distorted because managers interpret the environment as a function of their past 
experiences and this may lead to systemic bias in their assessments due to limited cognitive 
abilities (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). One of the strategies put forth in the theory, as a means 
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for dealing with the conflicting demands of an external environment, was for an organization 
to absorb external constraints by altering its boundaries since diversification buffers against 
environmental uncertainty (Wry et al., 2013).1 
Knight’s inquiry was into the ‘problem of profit’; specifically, why profits existed when 
economic theory says that competition should preclude them. For Knight, the key was in the 
fine distinction between situational hazards of Risk and Uncertainty, and how each hazard 
affected the technique of business organization, that is, combining a sufficient number of cases 
such that the potential hazard will be borne in groups large enough to be reduced to substantially 
negligible proportions (Knight, 1921). It is precisely in situations of risk where there exists a 
substantial number of similar cases such that they can be grouped whereby the outcomes 
become predictable in a manner consistent with the laws of chance, and any error ascribed to 
the prediction approaches zero as the number of cases increases. This is the principle of 
insurance. 
By contrast, in situations of uncertainty, there is not a sufficient number of similar cases 
such that one could obtain a valid probability distribution of their outcome, and so this situation 
of uncertainty is not susceptible to elimination through the principle of insurance, that is, 
diversification (Knight, 1921). Business decisions are largely made under such uncertain 
circumstances (Knight, 1921) because changes from the variable external environment (Hannan 
and Freeman, 1977, 1984; Haveman, 1992; Oliver, 1991) often bring about situations that are 
all too unique for determining valid probabilities. The presence of uncertainty necessitates the 
need to act on opinion rather than on knowledge, subjecting individuals to the liability of erring 
in an unknowable fashion.  
Thus, in situations of risk, errors in estimates tend to zero, whereas in situations of 
uncertainty the errors are unknowable. Nonetheless, the opportunity for economic actors (e.g. 
                                                          
1 Absorption of risks through diversification is a central feature of paper 3 
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firms) to deal with uncertainty through grouping constitutes a strong incentive to extend the 
scale of operations of a business establishment (Knight, 1921). In doing so, one extends the 
scope of their exercise in judgment over a greater number of decisions or estimates, and the 
chances rise that accurate estimates will, in aggregate, neutralize bad estimates; this provides 
for a degree of constancy and dependability in the overall outcome. In fact, the superiority of 
the corporation over other organizational forms is partly in its wide scope of operations that 
encompass a larger number of individual decisions. This, in essence, is the process of 
diversification.  
Therefore, both RDT and Knight’s theory of profit propose diversification as a strategy 
for dealing with uncertainty, and both theories recognize the limitations of diversification in 
dealing with uncertainty as largely a question of limited cognitive ability. In other words, the 
extent of a firm’s success in dealing with uncertainty will depend on the extent to which its 
assessments/estimates of the environment are correct. This dissertation thus employs both 
theories to provide insight into the ramifications for cognitively-constrained organizations 
using resources to deal with uncertainty.  
In the first paper, the ramifications are subsidiary power decline. In the second paper, 
the ramifications are a subsidiary’s diminished interest in internal power dynamics because of 
increased interest in external power dynamics. In the third paper, the ramifications are that 
firms, and specifically investors, are punished for assuming risk (i.e. not diversifying 
idiosyncrasies) but are rewarded for assuming the resulting uncertainty stemming from 
diversification across the wider market, which is non-diversifiable. Furthermore, each paper 
tackles the limitation of diversification as a function of limited cognitive ability. In the first 
paper, it is presented as knowledge-based factors: causal ambiguity, absorptive capacity, and 
arduous relationships. In the second paper, it is modeled as risk aversion, which is equal to the 
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inverse of the constraint on information flow. In the third paper, it is presented as the inability 
to always classify instances of sufficient homogeneity and frequency.  
First Paper 
Owed to a lack of a sustained program of theory development in the RDT tradition (Wry 
et al., 2013), the literature has left the theory open to one particularly unsavory prediction: a 
subunit can infinitely increase its power by simply continuing to embed in the local 
environment. This particularly vulnerable prediction is not, however, consistent with RDT’s 
core tenets. Nevertheless, it is not surprising considering subsidiary decline is little researched 
(Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998), and even less researched is subsidiary power decline (Ambos et 
al., 2011), with the extant literature rather focusing on how a subsidiary gains power. 
This paper’s conceptualization provides a more complete picture of MNC power 
dynamics that has been missing in the literature. In a similar line of argumentation used in the 
theory’s explanation of a rise in subsidiary power, the paper employs RDT’s core tenets to 
explain how subsidiary power can decline within the MNC. The argument is that, as a 
subsidiary continues to embed externally, the strategic resources it develops, and transfers back 
to the MNC, become increasingly idiosyncratic. While this idiosyncrasy will initially provide 
the MNC a competitive advantage, and thus drive the subunit’s influence within the MNC, there 
are factors of this idiosyncrasy that force the boundaries of its management’s cognitive ability 
to become increasingly salient. Specifically, complexity-driven factors such as causal 
ambiguity, absorptive capacity and arduous relationships make the locally-gained knowledge 
less and less transferable to the MNC. In essence, there is a threshold of knowledge 
idiosyncrasy, at a given level of external embeddedness, beyond which knowledge transfers 
and, subsequently, subunit influence decline. This paper’s contribution is necessary because 1) 
the literature has largely avoided focus on subsidiary decline and 2) because there has been a 
research-exodus from RDT that has left the theory open to a vulnerable prediction. This 
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conceptual paper will synthesize the literatures on RDT, embeddedness and sticky knowledge 
transfer to offer a more reasonable prediction of RDT, a prediction that is also a topic little-
researched in the management literature:  subsidiary decline. 
Second Paper 
The second paper picks up from an intriguing phenomenon left unanswered in the first 
paper: a subsidiary’s waning interest in transferring critical knowledge back to the MNC, a 
source of its power. Indeed, empirical research has shown knowledge development and 
knowledge transfer to have an inverted U-shaped relationship (e.g. Mudambi et al., 2014b; Song 
and Shin, 2008). Thus, since RDT regards critical knowledge transfer to the MNC as the 
impetus to subsidiary influence within the MNC, it would defy the core arguments of RDT for 
a subsidiary to allow its knowledge transfers to the MNC to be impeded. Such inconsistencies 
have, over the years, contributed to the marginalization of RDT within the management 
literature (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Wry et al., 2013). However, rather than the 
inconsistencies pointing to a flaw in RDT’s tenets, paper 2 argues that they point to a flaw in 
the literature’s approach to the theory.  
Paper 2 ponders the question “well, if the focal subunit is not interested in maximizing 
knowledge transfer to the MNC, then what exactly is it interested in maximizing?”. In this 
paper, the key to the phenomenon is that the subsidiary is still indeed interested in maximizing 
power, just not internal power. As such, the paper takes a more holistic approach in 
conceptualizing subsidiary power, one that parses it into internal and external power since there 
is no reason to believe that RDT was meant to be applied non-holistically, with researchers 
haphazardly discarding certain relations, as sources of power, based on whether they originate 
in the internal or external network. The subsidiary also has relations outside the MNC, and these 
relations are sources of idiosyncratic competencies for the subunit. They provide the subunit 
with alternatives to the resources beyond the HQ’s fiat reach. That is because resources from 
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the subunit’s local environment are much harder for the HQ to exercise hierarchical power over, 
and are thus sustainable sources of bargaining power for the subsidiary (Mudambi et al. 2014a). 
Therefore, it is entirely plausible to postulate that, as a subunit externally embeds, its external 
relations become increasingly important for it relative to its internal relations. Therefore, the 
subunit would naturally begin to focus more on power dynamics in those external relations at 
the expense of the power dynamics within the MNC. 
Third paper 
In Knight’s classic 1921 work, he argued that there was a fatal ambiguity in the terms 
uncertainty and risk which must be gotten rid of, and that the use of the term risk in connection 
with the measurable probabilities of insurance gave some justification for specializing risk as 
objectively measurable and [true] uncertainty as subjectively measurable. However, in much 
of today’s literature, whether in Management, Economics or Finance, there is almost never a 
distinction made between risk and uncertainty. Klein (2005) pointed out that the literature on 
the theory of the firm rarely makes a distinction between uncertainty and risk, and uses crude 
measures of the former such as ‘variation of sales.’ However, variation (i.e. the standard 
deviation) of any return to firm is a standard measure of risk, not uncertainty; and uncertainty 
has been long identified as a construct that is difficult to capture (Downey & Slocum, 1975). 
The CAPM model provides an opportunity to capture the elusive construct of 
uncertainty. That is because the model is built entirely on the notion of a certain type of return 
- beta - that is earned above the risk-free rate. This juxtaposition of a beta return relative to a 
riskless return is crucial to the arguments of the third paper. Specifically, a risk-free return is 
theoretically zero, and the only return an investor can expect to have is beta, which is a return 
tied to the market, from which one cannot diversify away. This is parallel to Knight’s argument 
that risk cannot lead to a return whereas uncertainty would because the principle of insurance 
(i.e. diversification) cannot guarantee its elimination. Further complementing the CAPM model 
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is Information Theory, which employs the notion of Entropy to measure uncertainty. The beta 
and the entropy equations both feature the correlation coefficient, and when this coefficient 
goes to zero, both equations will equal zero (i.e. no uncertainty). Thus, it can be reasonably 
argued that beta well proxies the construct of uncertainty, whereas standard deviation of stock 
returns can be used as a measure of risk, as it traditionally is used in Finance. In operationalizing 
the constructs of risk and uncertainty, this paper will gage the extent and fashion of their 
influence on profits (measured by ROA and ROE). Should there be a distinction in their effects, 
it would lend credence to the argument, originally put forth by Frank Knight in 1921, that there 
is a need for all literatures to clearly distinguish between risk and uncertainty since they 
compensate differently for assuming them.  
The rest of this dissertation will be dedicated to the three papers and a detailed 
conclusion. In the conclusion section, the main arguments and ramifications of each dissertation 
paper will be recapped, and an overview and holistic synthesis of resource dependence theory 
and the theory of profit will be offered. 
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CHAPTER 2: SUBSIDIARY POWER DECLINE—THE TRADEOFFS BETWEEN     
                         INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EMBEDDEDNESS 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
One critical omission in Resource Dependence Theory is a clear limitation on the power 
attainable from within relationships of economic exchange. As such, the theory is subject to acute 
criticism that power can accrue infinitely to an entity that simply continues to embed. In this 
conceptual paper, we argue that, as the subsidiary continues to externally embed, the problems 
associated with sticky knowledge transfer become increasingly exacerbated up until a critical 
threshold of external embeddedness beyond which knowledge transfer from the focal subunit to 
the MNC begins to decline and, with it, its influence within the MNC. This paper rekindles the 
little-researched topic of subsidiary decline by synthesizing the literature on RDT, embeddedness 
and sticky knowledge transfer. The paper also brings to light the intriguing phenomenon of 
subsidiary waning interest in critical knowledge transfer to the MNC. 
 
Keywords: Resource Dependence Theory, HQ–subsidiary relationships, Subsidiary 
embeddedness, Knowledge transfer, Resource allocation, Intraorganizational power 
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Introduction 
A Multinational Corporation (MNC) consists of a group of geographically dispersed and 
goal-disparate organizations that includes its Headquarters (HQ) and different national subsidiaries 
(Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994). Thus, the MNC itself can be 
conceptualized as an interorganizational network1 that is embedded in an external network which 
includes suppliers, customers, regulators, and competitors; and the structures of these relational 
networks can be, and often are, very different (Westney, 1989). At the same time, the consideration 
of the MNC as an interorganizational network2 has been grounds for applying resource dependence 
theory (RDT) in understanding relationships within the organization (Herbert, 1984). RDT is based 
on the idea that, within an exchange relationship, whoever controls critical and scarce resources, 
on which others depend, will increase their own power (Doz and Prahalad, 1981). Nevertheless, 
and owed to a lack of a sustained program of theory development in the RDT tradition (Wry et al., 
2013), the literature has left the theory open to one particularly unsavory prediction: a subunit can 
infinitely increase its power by simply continuing to embed in the local environment. 
Relations that the focal subunit develops with local actors in the external network (also 
known as the local environment) become sources of idiosyncratic strategic resources (Andersson 
et al., 2007; Forsgren et al., 1999; Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1997). Such resources are transferred back 
to the MNC where they are leveraged to build distinct capabilities to best compete (Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 1989; Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Doz and Prahalad, 1984).3 As the subsidiary transfers 
back these locally-gained idiosyncratic resources, the MNC subsequently becomes dependent on 
                                                                
1 This is the federative view of the MNC (Kogut, 1983; Provan, 1983). That is, it is important to remember that much of the literature considers 
even relationships within an MNC to be interorganizational. This is the view of this paper. 
2 Consisting of a HQ and externally embedded subunits, where interdependencies arise among subunits as well as between subunits and the HQ, 
3 Consistent with the notion that an MNC’s competitive advantage is likely to stem from intangible firm-specific knowledge that is value-adding 
(Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2006; Spender, 1996). 
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the focal subunit for the aforementioned critical resources, rendering the subsidiary powerful 
within the MNC (Andersson et al., 2002, 2007), because the governance of knowledge transfer is 
a lever of power (Mudambi and Navarra, 2004; Mudambi et al., 2014b).  
However, a subsidiary’s relationships with local actors become increasingly idiosyncratic, 
or context-specific (Andersson and Forsgren, 1996; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Tavani et al. 2014). 
Indeed, the literature is abound with arguments that it is difficult to transfer idiosyncratic or tacit 
knowledge from one unit to another (Andersson et al., 2002; Hansen 1999; Jensen and Meckling, 
1992; Spender, 1996; Szulanski, 1996; Zander and Kogut, 1995). Thus, if RDT tells us that the 
transfer of [critical] knowledge explains a subsidiary’s rise in power within the MNC, then it would 
also follow from RDT that impairments (stickiness) to its transfer can similarly explain a 
subsidiary’s decline in power. Thus, this paper’s core argument is in fact that the seeds of a 
subsidiary’s power decline are sown into its ascendency. 
Indeed, subsidiary decline is little researched (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998), and even less 
researched is the decline in subsidiary power (Ambos et al., 2011), with the extant literature rather 
focusing on how a subsidiary gains power. Without adequately understanding subsidiary decline, 
the literature has allowed itself an incomplete understanding of interorganizational relationships 
and exposed RDT to undue criticism. Therefore, in order to contribute to a more comprehensive 
and sustainable understanding of interorganizational relationships, the following research question 
is proposed: how does resource dependence theory explain not only a subsidiary’s rise in power 
within an MNC but also its decline?  
We argue that as the subsidiary becomes more embedded in the external environment, the 
problems associated with sticky knowledge transfer become increasingly exacerbated until a 
certain threshold of subsidiary external embeddedness, beyond which knowledge transfer from the 
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focal subunit to the MNC is overwhelmed and begins to wane. The empirical findings of more 
recent literature (e.g. Mudambi et al., 2014b; Song and Shin, 2008), of the existence of a critical 
threshold of knowledge development beyond which knowledge transfer between the MNC and 
focal subunit declines, support and drive the argument of this paper. Subsequently, as this paper 
theoretically argues, the MNC necessarily becomes less dependent on the focal subunit for its 
competitive advantage and thus, as per RDT, the focal subunit’s influence within the MNC would 
subsequently decline. This theoretical line of reasoning is consistent with the argument of the 
paradoxical effect of external embeddedness raised in Andersson et al. (2007), and contributes to 
a more complete view of RDT that precludes the fatal criticism that the theory predicts a single 
all-powerful subunit or firm.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we position the paper within the 
context of resource dependence theory, taking the view of the MNC as an interorganizational 
network, itself embedded in an external network stocked with critical resources which allow for 
the possibility of subsidiary intrafirm power. Second, we examine this rise of subsidiary power 
within the MNC, a notion well-grounded in theoretical arguments and empirical findings. Third, 
we employ the core arguments of RDT to argue that the theory predicts, in a similar fashion to the 
chain-of-logic related to its rise, a decline in subsidiary power beyond a critical threshold of 
external embeddedness. Finally, there is a well-rounded discussion of this paper’s 
conceptualization as well as a delineation of a promising future research direction. 
The Federative MNC, External Network Resources, and Power 
The external network, which contains a stock of economic, social and cultural capital, 
provides a platform of exchange between all actors, and this platform is a source of subsidiary 
intrafirm power (Andersson et al., 2007), allowing a subsidiary to move from a subordinate 
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position to one of leadership (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). As a result, the traditional hierarchical 
view of the MNC, which confers upon subsidiaries little ‘ownership’ of decision-making rights, 
becomes weaker. The MNC thus came to be viewed as federative, a network system of a HQ and 
differentiated subsidiaries4 (Birkinshaw, 1997; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994). 
As a system of differentiated units, [federative] MNCs often behave like markets in the 
sense that there is competition for power within the MNC (Andersson et al., 2007; Galunic and 
Eisenhardt, 1996), and this power is a property of social relations rather than an attribute of a 
particular actor (Emerson, 1962). The locus of power within an exchange relationship can be found 
with those who control critical5 resources necessary for the survival (success) of others.6 Since 
power and dependence are obverse of one another (Wry et al., 2013), power explains behavior 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) in that actors seek to control resources on which others depend, 
because dependency engenders uncertainty7. This is consistent with the findings of Katila, 
Rosenberger, and Eisenhardt (2008) showing a tradeoff between access to resources and the 
potential of being taken advantage of. Thus, it pays to control critical resources, and subsidiaries 
that do so alter the landscape of power dynamics in the [federative] MNC. Mudambi et al. (2014a) 
argue that superior subsidiary resources allow the MNC to cope with threats and capitalize on 
opportunities in the external environment, meaning that the MNC’s geographically-disparate 
subsidiaries are differentially critical in dealing with crucial problems stemming from the external 
environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In fact, the MNC’s survival depends disproportionately 
on subsidiaries having embedded themselves in important locations that confer a significant 
                                                                
4Where some subsidiaries continue to function in the traditional competence exploiting role while others are competence creating (Cantwell and 
Mudambi, 2005). 
5 “Critical’’ in this instance measures the extent to which an organization is able to operate in the absence of the resource or in the absence of the 
market for the output (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
6 The skilled process of leveraging resources is called knowledge (Spender, 1996), where one subunit is affected by the experience of another 
(Argote and Ingram 2000; Szulanski, 1996). The literature has employed a diverse set of terminology to refer to knowledge: competencies, 
capabilities, routines, innovations (Argote and Ingram, 2000). 
7 Uncertainty is the degree to which future states of the world cannot be anticipated and accurately predicted (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).   
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competitive advantage upon the MNC (Forsgren, Holm, & Johanson, 1995). As such, control of 
critical resources allows a subsidiary the bargaining power necessary to influence resource 
allocation and overall MNC strategic direction (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Salancik and Pfeffer, 
1977). 
The concept of power, or influence, is however one involving endless disputes between 
researchers (Andersson et al., 2007). This paper defines power consistent with most of the research 
viewing MNCs as an interorganizational network, that is, power is conceptualized as the ability to 
overcome resistance from others, including sister subunits and the HQ, to achieve desired results. 
In other words, power means decision making will be operative (Jensen and Meckling, 1992).8 
Within the federative MNC the HQ is but one player among others involved in a bargaining 
process (Mudambi and Navarra, 2004), and in order to accurately understand the MNC power 
structure, it is imperative to account for power bases other than the HQ’s formal authority 
(Andersson et al., 2007). In fact, studies have shown that an HQ is often unable to capitalize on 
this formal authority (Bartlett, 2002; Barzel, 1997; Mudambi, 2011; O’Donnell, 2000), since HQ 
fiat power in MNCs is not absolute (Andersson et al., 2007; Hedlund, 1980; Hedlund, 1986; 
Forsgren, 1989; Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990; Doz and Prahalad, 1993; Ferner and Edwards, 1995; 
Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2001; Morgan and Whitley, 2003; Mudambi and Navarro, 2004). For 
example, the North American subsidiary of Philips wielded great power that the HQ was unable 
to contain (Bartlett, 2002), allowing it to source technology from a competitor rather than from its 
Dutch HQ. Datakom’s Swedish subsidiary also sold its competitor’s technology rather than that 
which its Turkish parent company produced (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008). Thus, studies 
uniquely modeling HQ fiat power to explain subsidiary control within MNCs face limitations that 
                                                                
8 There is indeed a rich literature that has delved into various forms of power (see Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008; Dörrenbächer and 
Gammelgaard 2011), but it is beyond the scope of this paper to dig into the nuances. 
Subsidiary power decline—The tradeoffs between internal and external embeddedness 
7 
 
 
could be addressed by recognizing the distinction between ownership rights and property rights 
(Mudambi et al., 2014a). A HQ’s fiat power stems from ownership rights, where intrafirm 
relationships are hierarchical and subsidiary decision rights are loaned out at the discretion of the 
HQ, and such decision rights and can be revoked at any time. In contrast to ownership rights, 
property rights are concerned with the source of control, in which the owner cannot prevent the 
non-owner from using the resources that form the basis of its power.  
Therefore, since this paper is concerned with resources that form the basis of subsidiary 
power, it is beyond its scope to consider subsidiary resources over which the HQ can easily enforce 
its ownership rights since these particular resources are unlikely, as far as the subsidiary is 
concerned, to be leverageable for power (Ciabuschi, Dellestrand, & Kappen, 2012). Such 
resources, which would include property, plant and equipment (PPE) and financial assets, would 
thus not form the basis of subsidiary power (Mudambi et al. 2014a). However, intangible assets, 
which form some of the MNC’s most valuable assets, such as technological or business-related 
knowledge would make HQ enforcement of ownership difficult because their nature renders their 
imitation near impossible. Intangible assets also account for about 70-80% of US market value 
(Sampath et al., 2016). As such, this paper is concerned with the knowledge transfer of 
idiosyncratic resources that are value-adding, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable (Barney, 
1991). We will revisit the notion of resources and power in the discussion section of the paper. 
Resource Dependence and the Rise of Subsidiary Power 
Evolution of the Subsidiary 
The external network itself can be seen as a strategic resource (Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Tavani et al., 2014), and one that affects a subsidiary’s capabilities (Andersson et al., 2002). This 
conceptualization of a subsidiary becoming interconnected with an external network, gaining 
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access to critical resources and thus increasing its power within the MNC is consistent with the 
notion of a subsidiary evolution (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; 
Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2006). Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) define subsidiary evolution 
as being ‘the process of accumulation or depletion of resources/capabilities in the subsidiary over 
time’, consistent with Prahalad and Doz (1981). Subsidiaries were initially regarded as having the 
role of adapting an MNC’s technology to local preferences and then gaging world demand for it, 
where advantages were developed at HQ and then leveraged oversees through foreign subsidiaries 
(Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). This is also referred to as ‘home-base exploiting’ (Kuemmerle, 
1999). However, vital links with customers and suppliers meant that subsidiaries develop their 
own unique capabilities, and can thus pursue local opportunities, and even leverage them within 
the MNC as well as globally.9 Furthermore, Uzzi (1997) argued that embeddedness procures 
benefits for organizations such as economies of time (quickly capitalizing on market 
opportunities), integrative agreements, Pareto improvements, allocative efficiency, and adaptation. 
Thus, what began as import-substituting units gradually transformed into competence-creating 
units that are internationally integrated (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005). Modeling the MNC as an 
interorganizational network with subunits embedded in an external network allows for the 
incorporation of the reality that a subsidiary can move from a subordinate position, to one of 
equality or leadership with the HQ (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). 
Developing Idiosyncratic Knowledge 
Embeddedness is generally recognized as having two dimensions: relational and structural. 
Relational embeddedness involves direct relationships with network participants, from whom the 
subsidiary learns. The extent of a subsidiary’s embeddedness is positively correlated with a 
                                                                
9 It should be noted that the literature has recognized that there are countries that are fundamentally strategic and therefore influence firm 
decisions, and countries that are peripheral (Prahalad and Doz, 1981). 
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subsidiary being able to not only identify new technologies but also developing them with partners 
(Andersson et al., 2007) in relationships that develop over time and become based on adaptation 
(Larson, 1992; Uzzi, 1997). The more strongly linked the ties, the more the parties are capable of 
identifying, adapting and exchanging information (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Mowery et al., 1996). 
Through mutual commitment and dependence, relational embeddedness is conducive to value-
creation (Holm et al., 1999). Firms make specific commitments that are unique to their relationship 
and so mutually adapt the activities of the other to varying degrees (Nell and Andersson, 2012), 
becoming increasingly exchange-specific and, with that, difficult to imitate or substitute 
(Andersson and Forsgren, 1996).  
More specifically, through these relationships within the external network, a subsidiary can 
develop their capabilities through business and technical embeddedness (Andersson et al., 2002). 
In fact, Mudambi et al. (2014a) show that technological and business-related knowledge are 
resources over which it is particularly difficult for the HQ to exercise their ownership rights, and 
therefore such resources can and are leveraged by subsidiaries to gain power. Deeper business 
relationships allow a subsidiary to better understand a changing business environment and adapt 
its practices accordingly. Similarly, higher technical embeddedness confers upon the subsidiary a 
greater capacity to absorb new technology and, as such, is critical to its competency development. 
As more information is exchanged through interactions, the possibility of value creation and 
innovation increases (Hakansson and Snehota 1995; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). Both closer business 
relationships and higher technical interdependencies with its external network raise the levels of 
unique competencies within the subsidiary that includes knowledge of specific skills or 
preferences of individuals, the intricacies of specific machines, knowledge of particular idle 
resources or inventories, and knowledge of arbitrage opportunities (Jensen and Meckling, 1992).  
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Knowledge Transfer, becoming critical, and gaining influence within the MNC 
In contrast to relational embeddedness, structural embeddedness is concerned with the 
system of relationships within the network, where it is not information exchange that matters but 
rather the centrality of the subsidiary within the network. When the focal subunit transfers back to 
the MNC locally-gained critical competencies, it comes to occupy a central position within the 
MNC (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990). It can be argued that transferring knowledge diminishes the 
subsidiary’s power since it would lose exclusive control over the knowledge assets once they are 
made available to the MNC. However, Mudambi et al. (2014b) argue that in a dynamic context, in 
which subsidiary and the MNC are involved in a lengthy relationship with repeated dealings, it is 
also justified to assume that subsidiaries gain power by continuously transferring their knowledge 
(Foss and Pedersen, 2002), while maintaining the threat of cutting off the flow.10 The importance 
of being a source of resource flow to the MNC is illustrated in the case of Canon. Canon HQ 
wanted its subunit Cannon Research Europe (CRE) to transfer knowledge in standardized form, 
but CRE went in a different direction, maintaining a process linkage where it would instead “carry 
over” the knowledge (Asakawa, 2001). The subunit remained a crucial link (process linkage) rather 
than simply stocking (output linkage) the MNC with knowledge. 
Remaining a process linkage is crucial for the subunit since knowledge should be viewed 
as the process of leveraging resources that are embedded within the local environment and the 
focal unit (Penrose, 1959), and these resources, in the form of technologies, talent or specialized 
information on local developments, imply strategic ramifications for the entire firm as a whole 
(Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008). As the focal subunit provides such resources to the MNC, the 
dependence of sister units on the focal subunit grows, increasing the focal subunit’s criticality to 
                                                                
10 The importance of the flow of resources is also emphasized in Freeman (1979) 
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the MNC as it becomes a main source of competitive advantage for the MNC (Argote and Ingram, 
2000; Ghoshal and Nohria, 1989; Nell and Andersson, 2011; Szulanski, 1996; Tavani et al., 2014). 
As a source of MNC competitive advantage, the focal subsidiary increasingly occupies a critical 
position within the MNC. Criticality in this sense means that without this knowledge transfer from 
the focal subunit, the MNC would not be able to survive. One way of looking at the degree of 
criticality of a subsidiary to the organization as a whole was introduced by Bouquet and 
Birkinshaw (2008) as the subsidiary’s weight within an MNC.  
However, the subunit’s power within an MNC depends on the subsidiary being able to 
successfully transfer back the unique competencies to the MNC (Tavani et al., 2014). The more 
widely applicable the focal subunit’s competencies are within the MNC, the greater its influence 
over strategic decisions within an MNC (Forsgren and Pedersen, 2000). The local environment is 
a crucial component of unique knowledge inflows into the MNC, and the greater this knowledge 
is dispersed and used throughout the organization, the greater the influence of the locally 
embedded subsidiary (Mudambi and Pedersen 2007). 
Sticky Knowledge Transfer and decline in Subsidiary Power 
Knowledge Transfer Goal Incongruence within an MNC 
Subsidiaries accumulate resources and capabilities that are unique to them which is the 
result of a unique development path its relations within the local environment confer upon the 
embedded subsidiary. Thus, the subunit builds an idiosyncratic profile of skills and competencies 
(Uzzi, 1997). However, the concept of competencies that are ‘’too idiosyncratic’’ is highly relevant 
when discussing influence and power within the MNC. This is because it affects the quality of the 
relationship between the focal subunit and the MNC (or HQ). The quality of the relationship 
between the HQ and a subsidiary is important for subsidiary and MNC development (Birkinshaw 
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and Hood, 1998) as well as for subsidiary influence (Andersson et al., 2007; Cook et al., 1983; 
Mudambi and Navarra, 2004; Yamin and Andersson, 2011). As subsidiary actions are directed at 
local, as opposed to MNC-wide, objectives (Andersson et al., 2002; Andersson et al., 2007; 
Mudambi and Navarra, 2004), there certainly exists, within an MNC, a goal incongruence with 
respect to knowledge transfer (Mudambi et al., 2014a). This paper thus argues that this goal 
incongruence results in the subsidiary becoming more embedded than is optimally necessary to 
maximize knowledge transfer to the MNC, as it builds ever more idiosyncratic relations with local 
partners that, in turn, render its knowledge development increasingly non-transferable, a 
phenomenon known as sticky-knowledge transfer. 
Tacit Knowledge 
One of the most frequently cited sources of knowledge stickiness is tacitness (Anderesson 
et al., 2015), which is a main attribute of knowledge with respect to its transferability (Grant, 1996; 
Szulanski, 1996), rendering transfer both within and across different organizations increasingly 
difficult because the knowledge is derived from either unique local competencies or from a firm-
specific network (Cantwell and Santangelo, 1999). The difficulty in the transfer of tacit knowledge 
is owed to its complexity, and the level of complexity in a set of knowledge is, in turn, a function 
of the level of its codification11 (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Zander and Kogut, 1995) as well as its 
interdependent components (Hansen, 1999; Teece, 1986; Winter, 1987).12  
Evidence from the literature has shown sticky knowledge transfer as arising from mainly 
two reasons: motivational and knowledge-based factors (Anderesson et al., 2015; Grant, 1996; 
                                                                
11 Knowledge that is well coded is knowledge that is alienable to whomever created it (Kogut and Zander, 1992). Codification is a set of rules or 
procedures to communicate the knowledge (Hansen, 1999; Kogut and Zander, 1992). If codification of tacit knowledge is not possible, then its 
transfer is slow, costly and uncertain (Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992).  
12 Polanyi’s (1966) notion of tacit knowledge, underlied by problems communicating skills, is an idea akin to complex knowledge (Kogut and 
Zander, 1992). 
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Szulanksi, 1996). Specifically, there may be an unwillingness to receive or transfer the knowledge, 
or there might be a hindering of the transfer due to the nature of the knowledge itself.  
Motivational Factors 
A sender’s willingness to send tacit knowledge hinges on the extent of the knowledge’s 
appropriability, or a return equal to the value it creates (Grant, 1996). Subunits with greater 
competencies may be less willing to share knowledge (Mudambi et al., 2014b). This is exacerbated 
with subunits in competitive or substitutive configurations who would compete for resources as 
they view one another as rivals (Andersson et al., 2015; Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Galunic and 
Eisenhardt, 1996) and would thus be less motivated to share resources. The sending-subunit may 
also deem such a transfer to be too resource and time-consuming (Szulanksi, 1996). 
On the other hand, knowledge transfer can be hindered due to the unwillingness of the 
recipient entity to welcome such a transfer, in which case it would resist the transfer. This may be 
related to trust, reliability, or the influence the sender-unit unit would subsequently have over the 
receiving unit (Szulanksi, 1996). A recipient unit may have the NIH ‘not invented here’ syndrome 
(Hayes and Clark, 1985), and may procrastinate, sabotage or simply reject the transfer (Szulanski, 
1996). One well known acute case of NIH is that which existed between Canon and its European 
subunit CRE (Asakawa, 2001). Another example is of German companies, which have also shown 
a potent bias to “German engineering” that has hindered their ability to absorb promising external 
R&D solutions (Lüttgens, Antons, Pollok, & Piller, 2014). Similarly, Apple’s managers, in the 
1990s, rejected good external ideas because they were suspicious of strong external ideas 
(Burrows, 2000). 
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Knowledge-based Factors (Causal Ambiguity, Absorptive Capacity, Arduous Relationship) 
The inherent nature of the knowledge itself can be a barrier to its transfer. The nature of 
knowledge is tied to its tacitness and complexity (Tavani et al., 2014). The more tacit the 
knowledge, the greater the causal ambiguity surrounding the knowledge. With causal ambiguity, 
it becomes difficult or impossible to recreate the knowledge because it is not understood 
(Szulanksi, 1996); and a lack of understanding is a sufficient condition of uncertainty (Argyres, 
1995).  
Knowledge transfer is also dependent on the recipient’s ability to add new knowledge to 
existing knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Grant, 1996). The receiving unit may simply lack 
the capacity to receive and integrate the incoming knowledge into their operations. An MNC’s 
ability to recognize new external information, assimilate it, and commercially apply it, is crucial 
to the development of its capabilities, and is deemed the firm’s absorptive capacity (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990). Absorptive capacity is viewed as a source of an MNC’s competitive advantage 
(Song and Shin, 2008), and although it can be directly enhanced through technical training of 
workers, or indirectly through R&D investments, it is however a function of the preexisting stock 
of knowledge (Szulanski, 1996). The MNC needs prior relevant knowledge to integrate new 
knowledge, since knowledge is cumulative and learning one task may very well facilitate learning 
a subsequent, related, task. The MNC as a whole must therefore have at least some overlapping 
shared knowledge, meaning a certain level of additivity between the sets of knowledge must exist. 
That is because when knowledge structures of an MNC are highly fragmented, the necessity of 
shared knowledge becomes more acute (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Two well-known examples 
of fragmentation issues are Cargill’s diverse markets (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008) and General 
Motors’ automation disasters in the 1980s (Argyres, 1995). 
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Higher tacitness in the focal subunit’s competencies could also spell an arduous 
relationship with its sister subunits (Szulanski, 1996). Due to the complexity in the knowledge 
gained by the focal subunit, its transfer may become laborious and tedious, especially if the 
organizational structure is not conducive to facilitated transfers of such knowledge. In addition, 
capabilities are usually developed at the margin of existing capabilities (Birkinshaw and Hood, 
1998), meaning their complexity increases each time, inherently rendering subsequent transfer 
processes increasingly more complex. As a consequence, the relationship involves a certain level 
of hardship that makes it less attractive to both parties.  
Knowledge transfer increasingly impaired 
It is thus entirely plausible that, as the focal subunit externally embeds, motivational and 
knowledge-based factors- drivers of sticky knowledge transfer- become more acute because the 
focal subunit’s knowledge is becoming more context-specific. Thus, we argue that as subsidiary 
external embeddedness increases and its competencies consequently become more idiosyncratic, 
the absorptive capacity of the sister subunits declines, the causal ambiguity of the locally-gained 
knowledge increases, the relationship between the focal and sister subunits becomes more arduous, 
and the motivation, of both parties, to engage in knowledge transfer declines. As a result, 
knowledge transfer is increasingly impaired at higher levels of subsidiary external embeddedness.
 Thus, if RDT predicts that increasing [critical] knowledge transfer to the MNC will 
increase subsidiary power within an MNC, then the theory would also predict that a subsequent 
decline in knowledge transfer would, for the same reasons, lead to the atrophy of subsidiary power. 
Indeed, the literature tackling knowledge transfer has empirically shown important curvilinear 
relationships that pave the way for this paper’s central argument: RDT does not predict an 
infinitely powerful firm because the relationship between external embeddedness and subsidiary 
Subsidiary power decline—The tradeoffs between internal and external embeddedness 
16 
 
 
power exhibits a critical threshold of external embeddedness beyond which subsidiary knowledge 
transfer subsides. Two such empirical findings are in Song and Shin (2008) and Mudambi et al. 
(2014b). 
Song and Shin (2008) find strong empirical evidence that HQ knowledge-seeking is a 
curvilinear function of existing technological capabilities. The idea is that units are initially setup 
abroad to acquire and develop competencies that are complementary to those existing in the home 
country, and so contribute to the MNC’s absorptive capacity. However, at some point, the MNC’s 
capabilities develop their own particular technological trajectory such that the MNC becomes less 
inclined to continue sourcing knowledge from its locally embedded subunit since such path-
dependence engenders a misalignment between the capability profiles of the MNC and the 
knowledge source, that is, the focal subsidiary. Indeed, the core competencies of subunits must be 
a source of unique knowledge gains for the MNC as a whole (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996). 
In addition to these findings are those of Mudambi et al. (2014b) who report a curvilinear 
relationship between subsidiary innovativeness and knowledge transfer to the MNC, where the 
subsidiary’s role in the creation of knowledge is the degree of subsidiary innovativeness. The 
authors argue that at very low levels of innovativeness, the subsidiary does not have anything to 
gain from withholding knowledge from the MNC, but as subsidiary innovativeness increases, the 
benefits of rent-seeking also increase. In addition, at high levels of innovation, the subsidiary is 
faced with a resource allocation problem in which it would need to dedicate scare resources to 
knowledge creation, which comes at the expense of dedicating such resources towards transferring 
the knowledge back to the MNC. Thus, at high levels of innovation, there is a tradeoff between 
resources for knowledge generation within the subsidiary and knowledge transfer to the MNC. 
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This is consistent with the notion that the forces of the social community and rent-seeking coexist 
(Mudambi, 2011). 
Decline in Subsidiary Knowledge Transfer to the MNC 
Sticky knowledge transfer means that there would naturally be fewer interactions between 
the focal subunit and its sister subunits, that is, lower internal embeddedness. The less frequent the 
focal subunit interacts with its sister subunits (i.e. lower Internal Embeddedness), the more likely 
the sister subunits will question the focal unit’s trustworthiness, reliability and intentions since 
internal embeddedness fosters mutual adaptation and linkages by way of decreasing motivational 
and cognitive problems, and increasing willingness and learning capabilities (Lane and Lubatkin, 
1998; Tavani et al., 2014). Therefore, as the focal subsidiary further externally embeds, such 
benefits from internal embeddedness disappear because it interacts less with sister subunits. This 
is consistent with Uzzi (1997) who listed the three components of embeddedness as being trust, 
knowledge transfer, and problem solving. Internal embeddedness can considerably augment the 
ability of a focal subunit to develop knowledge (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Provan, 1983; Tavani 
et al., 2014). Frost (2001) shows that subsidiaries with both, internal and external embeddedness, 
are better able to develop new knowledge than subsidiaries with only external embeddedness. In 
addition, although autonomy and local resource procurement (i.e. external embeddedness) are 
associated with increased innovation, it results in lower adoption and diffusion (Ghoshal and 
Bartlett, 1988). In some cases, it can even lead to technical isolation because the interactions 
between the subsidiary and its local partners become too complex and idiosyncratic that they 
cannot easily be used by sister subunits (Asakawa, 2001; Birkinshaw, 1996; Forsgren, 1997). As 
the subsidiary’s level of external embeddedness continues to grow, its competencies become 
increasingly idiosyncratic where the knowledge is less and less adaptable to the MNC (Lane and 
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Lubatkin, 1998; Tavani et al. 2014). This means that the focal subunit’s interactions with its sister 
subunits will decline and, with it, mutual adaptation, a critical ingredient in the success of 
knowledge transfer (Leonard-Barton, 1988). As such, the relationship between the level of 
idiosyncratic capabilities of a subunit and knowledge transfer to the MNC exhibits a critical 
threshold beyond which the initial positive relationship is reversed. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Decline of Subsidiary Criticality to MNC 
Indeed, the value of critical resources depends on the continuous interactions that unite 
actors (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008), and this inverted relationship between subsidiary 
idiosyncratic capabilities and knowledge transfer has implications far and wide from an RDT 
perspective. If the transfer of idiosyncratic capabilities augments a subsidiary’s criticality to the 
MNC, then their decline from eventually being becoming too relationship-specific would have the 
reverse effect. Fewer critical resource transfers back to the MNC results in the focal subsidiary 
being less critical to the organization as a source of competitive advantage. Barriers to knowledge 
transfer reduce organizational flexibility (Kogut, 1985; Szulanski 1996), and flexibility is a source 
of certainty. Therefore, if a subsidiary is no longer able to help an MNC cope with said uncertainty, 
then it loses its criticality to the MNC. This implies that subsidiary idiosyncratic capabilities and 
criticality exhibit an inverted U-shaped relationship. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here. 
------------------------------------------- 
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Decline of Subsidiary Power within the MNC 
To the extent that a subsidiary can transfer back, to the MNC, the competencies it 
developed locally, RDT predicts the subsidiary becoming more critical, more influential and thus 
more powerful within the MNC (Tavani et al., 2014). However, as its criticality declines due to 
further external embeddedness beyond the aforementioned critical threshold, we argue that, per 
RDT, so too does the subsidiary’s ability to influence MNC corporate objectives, that is, its power 
declines. Power, or influence, is dependent on criticality13 which is dependent on being able to 
transfer those unique resources to the MNC in the first place. If a subsidiary is no longer able to 
transfer critical knowledge back to the MNC because said knowledge has become too relationship-
specific, then the subsidiary itself becomes less critical to the MNC, since the MNC would come 
to depend less on the focal unit for its survival. Therefore, the focal unit’s power within the MNC 
would begin to wane- a prediction consistent with the core tenets of RDT.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 3 about here. 
------------------------------------------- 
However, it must be emphasized that the driver of power is not external embeddedness per 
se. Rather it is the transfer of critical knowledge on which the MNC depends for its competitive 
advantage or dependency management. Andersson et al. (2007)’s findings suggest that high 
embeddedness of a subsidiary in and of itself is not necessarily important; rather, what is important 
is the ability of the subsidiary to transfer, back to the MNC, the unique competencies developed 
as a result of subsidiary external embeddedness. This is consistent with the findings of Tavani et 
al. (2014). A subsidiary that is able to leverage critical resources from external embeddedness, 
rather than just simply being externally embedded, is a subsidiary that is able to gain importance 
                                                                
13 That is, being central within the MNC (structural embeddedness) and possessing unique resources the MNC needs (relational embeddedness). 
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and subsequently influence within the MNC. A subsidiary must therefore be a provider of unique 
competencies to the MNC; knowledge transfer is the anchor of subsidiary power. 
Discussion 
Revisiting the notion of Resources and Power in the Paper 
With HQ facing inherent problems in linking itself to the subsidiary’s local business 
environments, the subsidiary’s exclusive linkage to its external environment is a source of power 
that is, in fact, considered rather sustainable (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2011). That is 
because critical resources are specific to the host country location and/or specific business 
networks (Rugman and Verbeke, 2001). These location-bound and business network-specific 
resources are near impossible to imitate, often being a product of socially complex interactions 
between the subsidiary and its local environment (Barney, 1991), and it is precisely such resources 
that this paper focuses on: resources that are rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable. Such resources 
would form the basis of subsidiary power (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977, 1978).14  
Furthermore, it is necessary to view the subsidiary as a supplier of resource flow to the 
MNC, not as a provider of resource stock, as continuity is highly important (Argyres, 1995; Foss 
and Pedersen, 2000; Winter, 2017). As an MNC’s external environment demands constant 
adaption and change (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1984; Haveman, 1992; Oliver, 1991), it would 
not suffice, in the long-run, for an MNC to rely on its current stock of resources which are bound 
to become obsolete (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008). Necessary is a continuity of resources, from 
the external environment, that provides the MNC with a competitive advantage. The distinction 
can be boiled down to short-term gains vs long-term survivability. For the latter, it is important to 
                                                                
14 Though it has been argued that financial control is a critical lever of power, Mudambi and Navarra (2004) showed that subsidiaries with control 
over technological resources (i.e. intangible knowledge) were able to wield greater control over their financial resources than those that did not 
possess such control. 
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have a flow of resources, since an MNC’s current stock of knowledge is likely to become less 
relevant as the demands of the environment change over time. In this respect, a forward-looking 
MNC will always value resource flow over resource stock, consistent with Nelson and Winter’s 
(1982) classic argument that firms are engaged in a continuous search and selection process to 
upgrade knowledge. 
Practical Implications 
It is certainly a critical balancing act to build local relationships and competencies while at 
the same time maintaining connectedness to the MNC, and both subsidiary managers and HQ 
executives need to heed this. Subsidiary managers must be keenly aware of the impact that such a 
balance has on both subsidiary growth in the local market and on its influence within the MNC. 
Datakom Sweden presents a good example of a subsidiary striking a good balance by paying 
enough attention to its external market to capitalize on growth opportunities that its Turkish HQ 
did not foresee (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008).15 By contrast, the subsidiary Philips North 
America did not strike an appropriate balance. The American subunit marketed competitor 
technology under Philips US brands in defiance of its Dutch parent company. However, Philips 
North America was unable to build the efficiency and credibility it needed in order to challenge 
the dominance of the Japanese VCR business (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2002). As a result, the HQ 
bought back a majority of the shares to limit the autonomous moves of the North American 
affiliate. This case represents a clear rise and fall in influence of a subsidiary that went too far in 
becoming dissimilar to the capability profile of the MNC such that its influence diminished and 
allowed the HQ to flex its muscle.  
                                                                
15 Studies have indeed shown that subunits do balance the pressures of local responsiveness and MNC integration (e.g. Banerjee et al., 2018). 
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For the HQ, striking the right balance is also vital as there is a tendency for HQ to reject 
even promising and profit-making subsidiary initiatives, the result of the “corporate immune 
system” (Birkinshaw and Ridderstrale, 1999, Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2006). Striking the 
correct balance requires diligent and continuous evaluation of the benefits and costs of these 
relationships and, where possible, establishing synergies between the focal subunit’s relationships 
within the internal and external network. For the HQ, on the one hand, its subsidiaries must be 
sufficiently embedded in the local environment in order to procure unique capabilities to transfer 
back to the MNC but, on the other hand, must not be so externally embedded that knowledge 
becomes so relationship-specific that their transfer back to the MNC is no longer feasible. One 
stark example of fragmented knowledge sharing is General Motors. GM divisions had a go-it-
alone approach to procuring technologies, balking at calls for procurement from a fixed partner 
supplier network. As a result, by 1987 GM was doing business with 100 firms, almost half of 
which supplied it with 3 systems or less, and such fragmentation played a role in the technology 
backlash that spread to other tech areas of GM, leading to automation disasters throughout the 
1980s (Argyres, 1995). To be sure, the very notion of ‘striking the correct balance’ implies that 
there are certainly tradeoffs between internal and external embeddedness.  
Due to such tradeoffs, organizations must have a holistic approach to relationships-external 
and internal- because both kinds affect the competency development and competitive advantage 
of the entire organization. By emphasizing the tradeoffs between internal and external 
embeddedness, this paper contributes to the theory development of RDT, a theory that has been 
criticized and on the decline over the years (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Pfeffer, 2003; Wry et al., 
2013). In order to address this, it becomes necessary to emphasize tradeoffs inherent in RDT. 
Bonardi (2008) shows the limitations on corporate influence via political action, which is 
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significant from an RDT perspective since one of the strategies put forth by RDT for managing 
dependencies was political action since governments are a great source of uncertainty. He finds 
that while firms can gain political leverage by forging an agreement with policymakers to commit 
to employee job security (a human resource commitment) as a nonmarket strategy, market 
strategies may clash with this when the firm needs to consider competitive forces. And since 
market strategies take precedence over nonmarket strategies, the firm is forced to scale back its 
commitments to policymakers in order to address competition. As such, the firm would lose clout 
in the political arena because it must manage dependencies elsewhere (i.e. vis-à-vis competitors), 
and so corporate influence over political agendas does exhibit a threshold. 
Future Research Direction 
This paper’s theoretical positing rested on the assumptions of the MNC as an 
interorganizational network, where subsidiaries can become powerful due to their exclusive access 
to critical resources that become more idiosyncratic to the local environment as it embeds further 
in it. However, although this paper contributes to a much-needed theory development of RDT, 
there remains a puzzling aspect not yet addressed in this paper nor in the literature. Specifically, 
although the key goal for a HQ is maximizing knowledge transfer of these critical resources from 
the locally embedded focal subunit that would fuel the MNC’s competitive advantage, for certain 
subunits, the key goal seems to be not congruent to that of the HQ. We in fact empirically observe 
subsidiaries allowing knowledge transfer to decline; indeed, the forces of rent-seeking are greatest 
in the most innovative subsidiaries (Mudambi et al., 2014b). One promising future stream of 
research would therefore explore this rent-seeking behavior of the subsidiary that raises an 
intriguing question: ‘why would a subsidiary allow knowledge transfer, a source of its power, to 
decline in the first place?’ This phenomenon of a subsidiary allowing its competencies to become 
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too idiosyncratic for transfer to the MNC is in direct conflict with the core arguments of RDT, 
which argues that actors always strive to maximize their power. If knowledge transfer is the source 
of subsidiary power, then allowing these competencies to become so idiosyncratic, that their 
transfer to the MNC is no longer possible, defies resource dependence theory. 
But then what exactly is the goal of the subsidiary if it is not to maximize knowledge 
transfer and, by virtue of RDT, its power? As we have not, in detail, tackled this notion within this 
paper, a promising future research direction would explore under which context this goal 
incongruence arises. Specifically, the incongruence between the objectives of the focal subunit, 
which embeds at a point that is suboptimal for knowledge transfer to the MNC, and the objectives 
of the Headquarters: maximizing knowledge transfers to the MNC from the locally embedded 
focal subunit. Andersson et al. (2007) identified a subsidiary’s waning interest in knowledge 
transfer to the MNC as a fascinating area for future research. Such a direction in research would 
certainly enrichen our understanding of Headquarters-subsidiary relations. 
Conclusion 
This paper’s conceptualization provides a more complete picture of MNC power dynamics 
that has been missing in the literature. We employ RDT to conceptualize how subsidiary power 
can decline within the MNC, in a similar line of argumentation used in the theory’s explanation of 
a rise in subsidiary power. This contribution is necessary since the literature has largely avoided 
focus on subsidiary decline and because there has been a sort of research exodus from RDT that 
has left the theory vulnerable to criticism, chief among them is that it does not predict a limit on 
firm power. Essentially, this paper synthesizes the literature on sticky knowledge transfer with 
RDT, linking them through their arguments on internal embeddedness to stave off the association 
of RDT with a fatal prediction. As sticky knowledge becomes more acute with further external 
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embeddedness, it reduces interactions among sister subunits, a necessary interaction in RDT for 
subsidiary power within an MNC. Thus, this paper is centrally about the tradeoffs between internal 
and external embeddedness that exist and, as such, preclude the emergence of a single, all powerful 
firm in RDT. Furthermore, this paper’s conceptualization leaves off with the intriguing question 
of why a subsidiary would allow its knowledge transfers to the MNC to decline if this is a main 
source of its power within the MNC. This implies goal incongruences between the subunit and the 
HQ, and exploring this phenomenon would certainly serve as an exciting and enriching future 
stream of research. 
It is important to note that this conceptualization does not argue that all subsidiaries are 
beyond the thresholds in the paper’s figures (i.e. that all subsidiaries lose power). Rather, the 
subsidiaries can be anywhere along the curves, which illustrate various possible outcome points, 
rather than predicted trajectories. In reality we will observe subsidiaries below, around and beyond 
the threshold, but the argument is that there is some critical threshold of external embeddedness 
beyond which subsidiary competencies become too context-specific for them to be transferable to 
the MNC. As a consequence, the MNC ceases to rely on the subsidiary for critical resources, and 
so the focal subunit’s influence begins to wane. Little to no attention has been given to subsidiaries 
to the right of this threshold, and it is important to investigate what is driving subsidiaries beyond 
this threshold because it raises a perplexing question from an RDT standpoint: If certain 
subsidiaries are not seeking to maximize knowledge transfer to the MNC, and by extension their 
power within the MNC, then what are they attempting to maximize? More management research 
is needed on the topic subsidiary decline in order to clarify the drivers of this aforementioned 
phenomenon. Such research would go a long way in advancing our understanding of 
interorganizational relationships and subsidiary decision-making. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESOURCES, UNCERTAINTY AND DEPENDENCE-- A HOLISTIC  
                         THEORY ON SUBSIDIARY POWER 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 The management literature has unreasonably debilitated resource dependence theory’s 
explanatory power by haphazardly omitting external relations when exploring subsidiary decision-
making and MNC power dynamics, myopically considering subsidiary power as having solely an 
MNC-internal component. The result is researchers exposing themselves to a fragmentary 
understanding of what truly drives subsidiary decision-making with respect to its knowledge 
development and, by extension, to its external embeddedness. In this conceptual paper we present 
a novel model that parses subsidiary power, into internal and external power, and conceives it in 
terms of utility. We argue that the subsidiary’s total utility is a function of internal power (vis-à-
vis the sister subunits) and external power (vis-à-vis local actors), therefore it aims to maximize 
its total power. However, since access to external network resources reduce the subsidiary’s 
inherent uncertainty from dependence on HQ resources, it increasingly places greater importance 
and focus on power dynamics in external relationships. As such, the subsidiary sacrifices internal 
power for external power, a welcome tradeoff it can leverage as bargaining power (vis-à-vis the 
HQ). By contrast, to increase its utility, the HQ seeks to decrease its own bargaining power. 
 
Keywords: 
Resource Dependence Theory, HQ–subsidiary relationships, Subsidiary embeddedness, Pareto 
Rents, Knowledge transfer, Interorganizational power, Decision-making, Organization and 
Management Theory
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Introduction 
The relations a focal subunit develops with local actors16, as it locally embeds, allow it to 
develop idiosyncratic resources (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2007; Forsgren, Pedersen, & Foss, 
1999) that it transfers back to the Multinational Corporation (MNC) as a source of competitive 
advantage (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). This transfer of critical 
knowledge allows the subsidiary to attain power, or influence, within the MNC (Andersson et al., 
2007; Mudambi & Navarra, 2004; Mudambi, Piscitello, & Rabbiosi, 2014b) as the MNC becomes 
dependent on the focal subunit for its competitive advantage. However, these resources eventually 
become highly idiosyncratic to the subunit’s local relationships as knowledge develops (Andersson 
& Forsgren, 1996; Asakawa, 2001; Birkinshaw, 1996; Forsgren, 1997). 
Indeed, research has shown knowledge development and knowledge transfer to have an 
inverted U-shaped relationship (i.a Mudambi et al., 2014b; Song and Shin, 2008).17 However, since 
RDT regards critical knowledge transfer to the MNC as the impetus to subsidiary influence within 
the MNC, it would defy the core arguments of RDT for a subsidiary to allow its knowledge 
transfers to the MNC to be impeded. Such inconsistencies have, over the years, contributed to the 
marginalization, of RDT within the management literature (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Wry, 
Cobb, & Aldrich, 2013) but rather than the inconsistencies pointing to a flaw in RDT’s tenets, we 
believe they point to a flaw in the literature’s approach to the theory. 
To this point, the literature on organizational power dynamics (e.g. Ambos and 
Schlegelmilch, 2007; Andersson, Forsgren, and Holm, 2002; Forsgren and Pedersen, 2000; 
Mudambi and Navarro, 2004) has not considered power accrued to a subsidiary in the external 
                                                                
16 These can be regulators, customers, suppliers, competitors etc. (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008). 
17 These findings corroborate the work done on knowledge transfer impediments (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Hansen 1999; Kogut and Zander 
1992; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Szulanski, 1996; Zander and Kogut, 1995). 
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network, focusing instead exclusively on subsidiary power accrued within the MNC (internal 
market). This myopic view of subsidiary power has diluted the explanatory prowess of RDT since 
it, however inadvertent, inaccurately assumes that power dynamics in external relations do not 
figure into subsidiary decision-making with respect to degree of embeddedness. There is no reason 
to believe that RDT was meant to be applied non-holistically, with researchers haphazardly 
discarding certain relations, as sources of power, based on whether they originate in the internal 
or external network. 
In their influential study, Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) showcased the unrealized 
explanatory potential of resource dependence theory by parsing the concept of interdependence 
into power imbalance and mutual dependence. In a similar vein to harness RDT’s true potential in 
explaining interorganizational relationships, we introduce a more holistic approach to 
conceptualizing subsidiary power, one that parses it into internal and external power, and 
conceives it in terms of utility.18 Indeed, research in the RDT tradition has focused on specific 
empirical motivations rather than pursuing a sustained program of theory-development (Wry et al., 
2013). Thus, we propose the following research question: why would a subsidiary decide to 
externally embed to a point where its resources become too idiosyncratic to be adaptable to the 
MNC, therefore eroding its own influence within the MNC?  
We argue that, for the subsidiary, power (utility) is derived from both the external and 
internal markets, and that its decision to embed is a function of balancing gains and losses in 
internal power (vis-à-vis sister subunits) with the gains and losses in external power (vis-à-vis 
local actors), with the end-goal of maximizing its total power, which we conceptualize as total 
expected utility. For the focal subsidiary that allows knowledge transfer to decline19, we posit that 
                                                                
18 To be exact, all conceptualizations and figures in this paper represent expected utility as a function of the relevant power an actor accrues. 
19 Important to recall that this paper is only concerned with explaining this phenomenon conceptually. 
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the gains in power in the external market outweigh the losses in influence in the internal market 
since the external market provides access to resources over which the HQ does not possess fiat 
power, a source of inherent uncertainty for the focal subunit.  
This paper provides novel and counterintuitive insights into drivers of MNC power 
dynamics by building a conceptual model that captures the presence of opposing utility functions 
between the focal subunit and HQ, which represent the occurrence of goal incongruences between 
them. This is profound since, when their respective utilities exhibit opposing preferences, two 
important things occur within the model: 1) the Pareto optimal set of the focal subsidiary’s external 
embeddedness levels is defined, and 2) the respective sizes of bargaining power of the HQ and the 
subsidiary are each defined.20 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, we provide a theoretical overview 
of RDT as well as frame our assumptions. Second, we view goal incongruences through the lens 
of Pareto optimal outcomes, whereby the HQ and focal subunit exhibit opposing utility functions. 
Third, HQ and subsidiary bargaining power as well as the necessary conditions for their occurrence 
are discussed. Fourth, we conceptualize the bargaining process as an optimization problem of each, 
the subsidiary and the HQ, that reflects a counterintuitive insight. Finally, we wrap up with a well-
rounded discussion of our conceptualization, including managerial implications. 
Resource dependence theory  
RDT states that, within an interorganizational relationship, actors will attempt to increase 
their relative power over others because they strive to reduce or avoid uncertainty, which is the 
degree to which future states of the world cannot be anticipated and accurately predicted (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978). According to the theory, uncertainty stems from dependence on others for 
                                                                
20 This also gives much more substance to the notion of Pareto rents identified in Spender (1996). 
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critical and scarce resources; and a subunit’s reliance on HQ resources represents an inherent 
uncertainty for the focal subunit. This is because the HQ has fiat power, or ownership, over said 
resources and so the subsidiary stands close to no chance at controlling them. 
However, one way for a subsidiary to reduce such uncertainty is to establish unique 
relationships, within the external network, which permit the development of idiosyncratic 
competencies the subunit can transfer back to the MNC. As such, the external network itself can 
be seen as a strategic resource (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Tavani et al., 2014), and one that affects a 
subsidiary’s capabilities (Andersson et al., 2002). Modeling the MNC as an interorganizational 
network, with subunits embedded in such external networks, allows for the incorporation of the 
reality that a subsidiary can move from a subordinate position to one of equality or leadership with 
the HQ (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998).21 In other words, the subunit leverages local relations to 
become powerful within the MNC (Andersson et. al. 2007). Power is a property of social relations 
rather than an attribute of a particular actor (Emerson, 1962). The more a subsidiary is externally 
embedded, the less it relies on the resources of the HQ since, through its external relations, it builds 
idiosyncratic capabilities and gains access to [local] critical resources (Andersson et al., 2007; 
Tavani et al., 2014). To the extent that these resources are essential to the MNC and for which 
there are no alternatives, they are indeed critical resources. This subsequently increases the level 
of dependency, of sister subunits, on the focal subunit, since the latter acts as a gateway between 
critical resources in the external network and the MNC. Therefore, RDT considers control of such 
resources to be paramount, since power and dependence (i.e. uncertainty) are obverse of one 
another (Wry et al., 2013).  
                                                                
21 Considering the MNC as an interorganizational network consisting of an HQ and externally embedded subunits, where interdependencies arise 
among subunits as well as between subunits and the HQ, has been grounds for applying RDT in understanding relationships within the 
organization (Herbert, 1984). 
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Although, from the perspective of RDT, the locus of power can be found with those who 
possess resources that are necessary for the survival (success) of others, it does not however 
provide a precise identification of these resources (Mudambi et al., 2014a). In this paper we do not 
consider subsidiary resources that can be acquired from the market without substantial transaction 
costs (Chang, 1996) or over which the HQ can easily enforce its ownership rights since the 
subsidiary would unlikely be able to leverage such resources as power (Ciabuschi, Dellestrand, & 
Kappen, 2012). Such excluded resources would include property, plant and equipment (PPE) and 
financial assets (Mudambi et al. 2014a). We are instead focused specifically on resources that are 
rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable (Barney, 1991), that is, critical resources which would form 
the basis of subsidiary power (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).22 Intangible assets, which form some 
of the MNC’s most valuable assets, and account for about 70-80% of US market value (Sampath 
et al., 2016). That is because their tacitness and complexity, that is, the nature of the knowledge 
(Tavani et al., 2014), render their imitation near impossible (Mudambi et al., 2014a). The 
recognition of these resources has since impoverished the traditional hierarchical view and given 
rise to the possibility of the powerful subsidiary (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Birkinshaw, 1997; 
Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990; Prahalad and Doz, 1981). In this paper, 
power is defined in a manner consistent with the research viewing the MNC as an 
interorganizational network; that is, as the extent to which an actor can overcome resistance from 
others to achieve desired results (Dahl, 1957). As Jensen and Meckling (1992) put it, power means 
decision-making will be operative.  
                                                                
22 Though it has been argued that financial control is a critical lever of power, Mudambi and Navarra (2004) showed that subsidiaries with control 
over technological resources (i.e. intangible knowledge) were able to wield greater control over their financial resources than those that did not 
possess such control. 
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Lastly, we focus on power-maximization and not profit-maximization for one main reason. 
There is a great tendency on the part of many researchers to blur the crucial and necessary 
distinction between decisions of ends and decisions of means. The only inquiries we as researchers 
of organizations are ever truly concerned with are inquiries of means because ultimately there 
exists only one end to all economic activity, which is already decided on before the business is 
even founded: to make profits. The decisions made by those within the business organization all 
strictly pertain to means- whether general corporate policy or detailed subsidiary strategy. By 
contrast, the decisions made with respect to ends are all made uniquely by consumers, that is, by 
individuals entirely outside of the organization. 
Oliver Williamson, in his influential 2009 Nobel prize lecture paper, argued that one way 
to introduce organizational considerations is to change the objective function of the firm by 
supplanting the neoclassical assumption of profit maximization with various forms of managerial 
discretion. This is consistent with Palmer et al. (1993) who state that coalitions implement 
structures that bolster their power vis-à-vis other coalitions, even at the sacrifice of some of their 
firm's profits, since power is a precondition of a claim on profits.23 Profit-maximization, in our 
opinion, is a better representation of the utility of shareholders.24 We will revisit the notions of 
power and profit-maximization in the discussion section of the paper. 
Goal Incongruences between the HQ and Subunit 
Whereas the subsidiary’s actions are directed at local, as opposed to MNC-wide, objectives 
(Andersson et al., 2002; Andersson et al., 2007; Mudambi and Navarra, 2004), the HQ’s actions 
are focused on ensuring a common strategy and the wide applicability of the knowledge being 
                                                                
23 One need not look further than the case of Amazon whose entire strategy up until recently has been to hemorrhage cash in order to gain market 
share. 
24 It is also our view that if profit-maximization ultimately represented managers’ utility, we would not, in reality, observe the existence of Boards 
of Directors or HQ monitoring. 
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transferred back to the MNC by its externally embedded subsidiaries (Andersson, Gaur, and 
Mudambi, 2015; Tavani et al., 2014). Thus, within an MNC, there is certainly goal incongruence 
with respect to knowledge transfer (Mudambi et al., 2014a), and as the focal subunit’s 
competencies turn increasingly idiosyncratic due to its relations with the external network 
becoming more sophisticated, the adaptability of these competencies, to the MNC, decline (Lane 
and Lubatkin, 1998; Tavani et al., 2014). Therefore, knowledge transfer, on which 
interdependencies and thus the focal subunit’s power hinge, would decline. Allowing adaptability 
of competencies to decline runs profoundly against the tenets of RDT because knowledge transfer 
is the basis of the subunit’s influence 
However, we argue that eventually the power ambitions of the subsidiary grow beyond its 
internal network; as it becomes more and more locally embedded, the subsidiary begins to shift its 
focus towards its relationships in its local network, essentially placing increasing importance on 
power dynamics within the external network than within its internal network. Eventually, the 
subsidiary reaches an initial critical threshold where any further increase in external embeddedness 
results in internal power declining; this point is what we refer to as the local threshold, or EE(L) 
in the forthcoming figures. It is the point at which a subsidiary’s internal power is maximized 
because [critical] knowledge transfer to the MNC is also maximized. However, as the external 
network aids the subsidiary in reducing inherent uncertainty brought about from dependency on 
HQ resources, over which the HQ holds fiat power (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008), the focal 
subunit has every incentive to embed beyond the local threshold. The subsidiary will continue to 
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externally embed itself up until its total power has been maximized; this point is what we refer to 
as the global threshold, or EE(G) in this paper’s figures.25 
In our model, externally embedding beyond the local threshold represents the emergence 
of goal incongruences between the focal subunit and the MNC. This incongruence stems from the 
fact that the subsidiary’s total power is maximized at a point of embeddedness that is beyond the 
level associated with maximum knowledge transfer to the MNC, that is, beyond the point at which 
the HQ’s resource-coordination role, and thus its own utility, is maximized.26 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
------------------------------------------- 
In figure 1 we model the inverse U-shaped relationship between subsidiary external 
embeddedness and power, driven by [critical] knowledge transfer in its exchange relationships.27 
28 The entire model is fundamentally predicated on contrasting what the literature has thus far 
exclusively considered (yellow dotted curve of only internal power) with what we argue the 
subsidiary actually considers when externally embedding (solid black curve of total power). In 
other words, the yellow dotted curve represents the management literature’s non-holistic approach 
to applying RDT to network relationships. We argue that the subsidiary’s relationships, external 
and internal, must be considered in their totality when applying RDT. This means simultaneously 
considering the internal and external networks as sources of power that drive subsidiary decision-
making with respect to embeddedness. By parsing subsidiary power into internal and external 
                                                                
25 Formally in this paper’s model, these thresholds exist due to risk aversion as well as complexity of relationships which we discuss later in the 
paper. These notions are essential to ensure, and consistent with empirical findings, that the subsidiary cannot just simply continue externally 
embedding and infinitely increase its power.  
26 One of the HQ’s greatest value-adding roles is the coordination of knowledge and activities within an MNC (Provan, 1983). 
27 It is important to recall that the model in our figures represents the expected utility. 
28 For internal power it would be critical knowledge transfer to sister subunits, for external power it would be to external actors with whom it also 
has exchange relations. Almost all economic behavior is embedded in complex social relation networks (Granovetter, 1985) where firms make 
specific commitments unique to their relationship. 
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power, we are permitting RDT its full explanatory potential with respect to interorganizational 
relations and subsidiary decision-making. 
As this paper seeks to explain the intriguing subsidiary decision to allow its knowledge 
transfer to the MNC to decline, a conceptualization via utility is very useful since decisions are 
made according to utility (Spender, 1996).29 As such, we can employ Pareto optimality to best 
capture the goal incongruences in knowledge transfer between the subsidiary and the HQ. Pareto 
optimality is a state that is achieved when the allocation of resources can no longer be reallocated 
in way that could make one better off, in terms of utility, without hurting another’s utility.  
The orange portion of the line in figure 2 represents the Pareto optimal set of subsidiary 
external embeddedness because, for all levels of subsidiary external embeddedness within this set, 
no one can improve their utility without harming the other. For example, if the subsidiary’s 
external embeddedness level was anywhere along the orange line and it further externally 
embedded to increase its total power (seen rising along the total power curve), it would harm the 
MNC because its locally-developed knowledge is less transferable to the MNC (seen declining in 
the corresponding level along the yellow-dotted internal power curve). Conversely, the HQ could 
employ counteractive control measures over the subsidiary, while it was anywhere along the 
orange line, to reduce its level of external embeddedness. In this instance, the subsidiary’s total 
power would decline as it becomes less externally embedded and, with that, has less access to 
external resource development. The MNC on the other hand would gain more critical knowledge 
as the subsidiary’s capabilities become more transferable due to less context-specificity in the focal 
subunit’s knowledge development through external relations. In the bottom portion of figure 3, 
these Pareto rents are depicted in attempts, by the subsidiary, to move in the direction of the blue 
                                                                
29 Our model assumes that the preferences of the HQ and subsidiary are convex to allow for the possibility of a bargaining process to occur. Simply 
put, this means that actors prefer combinations of inputs to their utility rather than exclusively one input.  
Resources, uncertainty and dependence-- A holistic theory on subsidiary power 
43 
 
 
arrows (higher external embeddedness) while the HQ tries to push it in the direction of the red 
arrows (lower external embeddedness) where knowledge transfer would be maximized; the 
corresponding indifference curves driving these decisions, on the part of both the subsidiary and 
HQ, are depicted in the upper graph of figure 3 (also in blue and red resp.). 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here. 
------------------------------------------- 
As seen in the upper portion of figure 3, up until the local threshold, the subsidiary and HQ 
(and MNC) both have utilities increasing in the same direction, consistent with the Pareto 
improvements in Uzzi (1997).30 Subsequently, between the local and global thresholds, the utilities 
of each are however increasing in opposing directions, with the subsidiary’s utility (blue 
indifference curves) continuing to increase in external embeddedness, while the HQ’s utility (red 
indifference curves) is now declining in subsidiary external embeddedness. In addition, up until 
the local threshold, the internal and external markets are complementary sources of power for the 
subsidiary.31 32 However, beyond the local threshold, the power markets become substitutable, 
implying that there is an amount of one source of power that the subsidiary has to give up in order 
to increase the amount of the other by one unit. In other words, further subsidiary external 
embeddedness increases the context-specificity of the knowledge development and lowers its 
transferability to the MNC, which naturally causes a decline in internal embeddedness.33 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 3 about here. 
------------------------------------------- 
                                                                
30 Pareto improvement is where one person is able to increase their utility without making anyone else worse off in terms of their own utility. 
31 Complementary means an increase in external embeddedness (further knowledge development) leads to an increase in internal embeddedness 
(i.e. higher interactions with sister subunits) since the focal subunit is, until the local threshold, interested in knowledge transfer to the MNC and 
internal power. More technically speaking, this is the result of supermodularity. 
32 As this procures a competitive advantage for the MNC as a whole, so too is the HQ or MNC’s utility, over this area, a function of complementary 
preferences between internal and external subsidiary embeddedness.  
33 Since the HQ or MNC’s utility is a function of subsidiary critical knowledge transfers, this would cause their utility to also exhibit, over this area, 
substitutable preferences over subsidiary external and internal embeddedness decisions. 
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Beyond the global threshold, subsidiary external power, and thus its total power, begin to 
decline. Subsidiaries are also conduits of knowledge for the local environment, passing it on from 
the MNC (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). At very high levels of external embeddedness, the 
subsidiary would have minimal or trivial contact with sister subunits, and this would harm its new 
knowledge development (Frost, 2001; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Provan, 1983; Tavani et al., 2014; 
Uzzi, 1997), reducing its influence vis-à-vis local actors. Any point beyond the global threshold is 
over-embeddedness, the existence of which would run counter to the established argument that 
over-embeddedness might lead to non-survival (Uzzi, 1997), as well as to corroboratory empirical 
findings (i.e. Nell and Andersson, 2012; Perri, Andersson, Nell & Santangelo, 2013). 
As seen in figure 3, our model allows us to demarcate, in a novel way, an area where the 
subsidiary and the MNC exhibit opposing preferences. This area defines the Pareto optimal set of 
subsidiary external embeddedness levels, representing goal incongruences in knowledge transfer 
between the HQ and the focal subunit. The emergence of goal incongruences triggers a process, 
conceptualized next, that the management literature has long called the bargaining process.  
The HQ-Subsidiary Bargaining process 
Between the local and global thresholds is the area over which bargaining between the 
subsidiary and the HQ occurs. The subsidiary wants to be at the global threshold because that is 
where its power is maximized. However, the HQ, whose role is the optimal deployment of 
resources and capabilities throughout the MNC, is concerned with knowledge application (Grant, 
1996). Therefore, for the HQ, subsidiary embeddedness beyond the local threshold is harmful since 
the focal subsidiary transfers back less critical knowledge to the MNC, hurting the MNC’s 
competitive advantage. The HQ could thus naturally react by trying to counter, through control 
measures, any level of subsidiary external embeddedness beyond the local threshold. In figure 4 
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we depict this potential ‘tug of war’, or bargaining process, between the HQ and focal subsidiary. 
The total bargaining process between the focal subsidiary and the MNC takes place in the maroon 
shaded area of figure 4. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 4 about here. 
------------------------------------------- 
To ensure the existence of a bargaining process in our model, the local and global 
thresholds are necessarily disparate, and the external environment is necessarily a net positive 
source of subsidiary total power. In other words, the model exhibits a simultaneous right offset 
and rise between peak total power and peak internal power, as shown in figure 5a. The offset 
simply represents technological dissimilarities between the MNC and focal subunit, while the rise 
is the basis of the holistic theory of subsidiary power put forth in this paper: the opportunity for 
the subunit to break away from the clutches of the HQ’s uncontestable hierarchical power. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 5a about here. 
------------------------------------------- 
To see the necessity of the right offset we examine the alternative scenario where the peak 
of total power is directly above the peak of internal power, seen in figure 5b. In this case, there 
would never be goal incongruences between the subsidiary and the HQ. The global and local 
thresholds would always be one and the same, and the utilities of the HQ and focal subsidiary are 
maximized at the same point of embeddedness; this means bargaining would never take place 
because there would be nothing over which to bargain. Another way to conceptualize the right 
offset is as the extent to which the capability profiles of the MNC and local environment are 
dissimilar. In assuming, and reasonably so, at least some dissimilarity between their capability 
profiles, we are in effect assuming an offset in the model. 
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------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 5b about here. 
------------------------------------------- 
The rise in our model says that a subsidiary that has allowed knowledge transfer to the 
MNC to decline does so because it is necessarily gaining power in the external environment, and 
does so net of any losses in power in the internal market. Assuming, in this context, that the 
subsidiary necessarily gains external power is reasonable for two reasons. First, the focal subunit 
must control the local resources, or at least the relationships providing access to them (Astley & 
Sachdeva, 1984; Forsgren et al., 2005), that it transfers back to the MNC which serve as a source 
of sustained MNC competitive advantage; otherwise, it has no credible threat to cut them off 34 
and could not ever gain bargaining power (i.e. power vis-à-vis the HQ). Therefore, if it controls 
critical local resources, then there must be at least some degree of influence over local actors. 
Second, a subunit can be assumed to have been locally established for the very reason that the 
MNC determined there must exist economic opportunities. It is thus reasonable to assume that 
subsidiaries, by and large, capitalize on these opportunities, and this translates to power over local 
actors.35 In addition, gains to total utility from external power are net of any losses due to a decline 
in internal power. This is because the external network significantly reduces, for the subsidiary, 
the inherent uncertainty of having to depend, in any substantial way, on the HQ for resources. The 
resources of the external network give the subsidiary the opportunity to accumulate strategic 
resources of its own, over which the HQ does not possess fiat power. Thus, the reduction in the 
inherent uncertainty, of dependence on HQ resources, outweighs the loss in internal power. 
                                                                
34 There must be a clear distinction made between the subsidiary as a source of resources [flow] and as a provider of resources [stock]. The former 
interpretation, which we take up, implies continuation is vital (e.g. Foss and Pedersen, 2002). The subsidiary is a link between the MNC and the 
local environment. An MNC cannot, at least long-term, simply count on the current stock of knowledge it has, since the environment requires 
constant adaptation through its impinging demands (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008). The subsidiary’s power is thus derived from its ability to cut 
off this flow. This is consistent with the evolutionary theory of Nelson and Winter (1982) where firms are engaged in a continuous search and 
selection process to upgrade knowledge.  
35 This is consistent with RDT’s assumption that organizations exercise some degree of control or influence over the resource environment or the 
organization's exchange partners for the purposes of achieving stability (Oliver, 1991). 
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Taken together, the modeled relationship between peak total power and peak internal power 
needs to contain a rise and a right offset; otherwise, we would be modeling a world in which there 
is never a bargaining process between the HQ and focal subunit.36 In short, the rise and the right 
offset guarantee the possibility of Pareto-rents, which have long been discussed, yet not modeled, 
in the literature. These rents trigger the bargaining process between the subunit and the HQ; and 
our conceptual model enables us to demarcate the amount of bargaining power that each, the 
subsidiary and HQ, gain during the bargaining process. Extending the horizontal internal power 
line at the EE(L) until it perpendicularly intercepts the vertical line at EE(G), as done in figure 5a, 
demarcates the size of each actor’s accrued bargaining power. This result is shown in figure 6. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 6 about here. 
------------------------------------------- 
The violet shaded area in figure 6 represents the gains in bargaining power that accrues to 
the subsidiary, which we conceptualize as the extent to which the subsidiary is able to leverage 
internal and external power- that is, total power- into power vis-à-vis the HQ. The red shaded area 
represents the net gains in bargaining power that accrues to the HQ, which also corresponds to the 
loss in internal power for the focal subunit. For the subsidiary, external embeddedness beyond the 
local threshold entails, on the one hand, gains in external power since it reduces uncertainty tied 
to relying on HQ resources but, on the other hand, also simultaneous losses in internal power due 
to transferring fewer critical resources back to the MNC. For the HQ, the subsidiary’s loss of 
internal power is, on the one hand, a gain in bargaining power but, on the other hand, represents 
losses in total power, or utility, because its role as MNC-wide resource coordinator is less valued 
                                                                
36 It is important to keep in mind that this paper’s model seeks to explain the intriguing phenomenon of subunits that have already allowed 
knowledge transfer to decline, which is the prelude to a potential bargaining process with the HQ. 
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since fewer critical resources to coordinate are being transferred back from the focal subunit. This 
is the web of tradeoffs for each, the HQ and focal subsidiary.  
Who gets the upper hand in the bargaining process really depends on the flow of these 
tradeoffs. For example, in figure 6, it is clear that the subsidiary has more resulting bargaining 
power than the HQ. In figure 7, we illustrate a counter narrative to figure 6, where further 
embeddedness beyond the local threshold results in the subsidiary having weaker bargaining 
power than the HQ, as it is unable to extract as much of it from its sources of power. The 
uniqueness of our model is that it captures the extent to which the focal subunit is able to leverage 
these sources of power- internal and external - into bargaining power vis-à-vis the HQ, a source of 
inherent uncertainty for the subsidiary due to the HQ’s fiat power. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 7 about here. 
------------------------------------------- 
Noteworthy is that the internal power curve in figure 6 is flatter than that in figure 7. Flatter 
curves- or thicker tails- are associated with inelasticity, so a relatively flatter internal power curve 
would mean that the subsidiary’s internal power level does not readily react to changes in the 
subunit’s degree of external embeddedness. In other words, the conditions in the internal and 
external market are relatively uncorrelated; in which case the subsidiary that embeds beyond the 
local threshold will see marked increases to its external power (which would be increasing) and 
minimal changes to its internal power (which would be decreasing), resulting in a relatively faster 
rise in total power. As such, the subsidiary’s decisions to embed will be increasingly driven by 
developments in the external market since it is a source of reduced uncertainty, and because there 
would be fewer negative ramifications in the internal power market.  
Another way to view it is that there is less complexity in the subsidiary’s decision-making 
process due to weaker correlations between the inputs to said decision-making process. This is 
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consistent with arguments and findings in the management and economics literature about the 
adverse consequences of complexity on decision-making (i.a Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; Nell and 
Andersson, 2012; Tadelis and Williamson, 2012). In fact, in comparing figures 6 and 7, we see 
that our model incorporates the notion that the focal subsidiary is able to extract less bargaining 
power when it faces a higher correlation between decision inputs.  
The subsidiary would thus prefer that the [conditions in the] internal and external power 
markets, as drivers of its utility, not be correlated in any way. The ideal situation is for it to be able 
to embed externally, as it sees fit, without this decision having any effect on its internal power 
level. Such correlation between decision inputs implies complexity, and complexity is a 
constraining factor on actors, specifically on their ability to maximize their utility because future 
states of the world cannot be flawlessly predicted due to limitations on the cognitive abilities 
required in processing the necessary information to do so. In other words, the subsidiary faces an 
optimization problem that it tries to solve, subject to certain constraints.37 
The Subsidiary’s Optimization Problem 
We formulate the subsidiary’s optimization problem as being one of maximizing its total 
power, where it must weigh the gains to its external power against the losses to its internal power, 
with the outcome representing the focal subunit’s ability to leverage them as bargaining power vis-
à-vis the HQ. When maximizing objective functions, decision-makers actively seek out 
information (Jensen and Meckling, 1992), consistent with the argument that possession of 
information is an important source of power (Davis and Cobb, 2009; Krackhardt, 1990). However, 
economic reasoning is limited by mental processes (Dacin, Ventresca, and Beal, 1999; Simon, 
1961; Zukin and Dimaggio, 1990), where actors are not always able to behave in the most optimal 
                                                                
37 The notion of the networks in which it is embedded being a constraint on an organization is rooted in the literature (i.a. Casciaro and Piskorski, 
2005; Granovetter, 1985; Oliver, 1996; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Resources, uncertainty and dependence-- A holistic theory on subsidiary power 
50 
 
 
way. Thus, we need to model an information flow constraint. To do this, we introduce the notion 
of signals, and do so consistent with Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2008). The signal represents 
new information concerning conditions within the MNC and/or external network. Possession of 
such information improves the accuracy of the subsidiary’s perception of its power position within 
the internal and external networks. The information can be in any form and touches on subjects 
ranging from technical abilities to business relationships to market opportunities. 
In information theory, a transmitter produces messages, or signals, that are communicated 
through a channel, over which the messages are inevitably modified. The receiver must thus infer 
which message has been transmitted. These messages represent flow of information. At its core, 
information theory quantifies information possession as a reduction in uncertainty, and this is 
measured by entropy. Entropy is thus a measurement of the unpredictability of a particular state 
with respect to its information content, and is zero when the outcome is certain.  
Consistent with Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2008), the flow of information between 
variables can be quantified as (derivation in Appendix A) 
 ({𝑋𝑡; 𝑌𝑡}) =  
1
2
𝑙𝑜𝑔2(
1
1−ρx |y
2  
)         
Where ρ2 is the correlation coefficient of the variables, 𝑋𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑡, and operator  measures the 
information flow between them (it is more accurate to label these as stochastic processes). 
Information possession reduces uncertainty, and the relevant information on a subsidiary’s 
internal and external networks is contained in the signals it chooses to receive. Let 𝑠𝑖
𝑡 denote the 
sequence38 of all signals that the subsidiary has received up to period t as well as all information 
the subsidiary uses in period t. Furthermore, let 𝑋𝑡 represent conditions in the internal market and 
𝑌𝑡 represent those in the external market. Then the subsidiary’s optimization problem is 
                                                                
38 𝑠𝑖
𝑡 = {𝑠𝑖1,𝑠𝑖2, ..., 𝑠𝑖𝑡} 
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𝑚𝑎𝑥
{𝑠𝑖𝑡}∈𝛤
 {T𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟}39    
Subject to  
1. I ({𝑋𝑡 , 𝑌𝑡 }; {𝑠𝑖𝑡}) ≤ κ  
2. 𝑚𝑖𝑛{ 𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐻𝑄} 
In essence, the subsidiary attempts to maximize its total power subject to two constraints.40 
The first constraint is the information flow constraint, which represents the subsidiary’s limited 
cognitive ability to process information, where the operator  measures the information flow 
between power dynamics (in each, the internal and external network) and the signal 𝑠𝑖𝑡 which 
contains information about the conditions in these networks. Modeling the optimization problem 
as such is consistent with Krackhardt (1990)’s argument that power accrues to not only those who 
occupy a central position within a network, but to those who also have an accurate perception of 
the network itself, in which they are embedded, irrespective of their position. From the perspective 
of RDT, organizational survival depends heavily on an accurate assessment of the environment, 
its demands, and the extent to which its various parties are able to exert their influence on the focal 
organization (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Wry et al., 2013). Knowledge of the network itself is an 
independent source of power (Andersson et al., 2002). Information flow is modeled such that the 
average per-period quantity of information that the sequence of signals contains is constrained to 
a level corresponding to the subsidiary’s maximum level of cognitive ability, given by parameter 
κ. Due to its cognitive limitations, the subsidiary directs the information flow to its internal and/or 
external power conditions, choosing which power source (internal or external network) on which 
to focus more. When power dynamics in the external market are more important for the subsidiary 
                                                                
39 More formally: 𝛦(μ) = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 = 𝑓(𝑋𝑡; 𝑌𝑡)- λ* ρx |y2 . This equation is elaborated on in Appendix B. 
40 These two constraints together with the rise and offset assumptions- to guarantee the presence of goal incongruences and the possibility for a 
subsidiary to gain bargaining power- determine how much bargaining power the subsidiary is able to extract from its internal and external 
markets. 
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in terms of maximizing its total power, the subsidiary focuses more on the external network relative 
to the internal network, choosing to receive more of the signals containing information about 
conditions in the external network than ones containing information on the internal network. This 
is consistent with Hart (2009) who argued the importance of signals related to industry conditions 
in improving matters for the firm. 
Information flow is a good proxy of the mental resources necessary for good decisions 
(Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2008). First, when the information flow is large (implying a high κ), 
the subsidiary’s responses will be close to the power-maximizing behavior (i.e. embedded at the 
global threshold). Second, when the subsidiary allocates a large portion of the information flow 
(i.e. its focus) to one variable (i.e. internal or external network), suboptimal responses to that 
variable become small. Third, the subsidiary must direct more information flow to the variable 
with higher variance or with low serial correlation (i.e. highly stochastic) in order to minimize 
suboptimal responses to that variable. Subsidiary suboptimal responses would be any 
embeddedness level that is not at the global threshold. 
The second constraint is the HQ’s own optimization problem, solved for at the local 
threshold where knowledge transfer is maximized. However, at the local threshold, the HQ’s 
bargaining power is zero. This raises the intriguing question of why a HQ would want bargaining 
power in the first place. In an ideal world, the HQ would not worry about needing bargaining 
power since all of its subunits would adhere to the corporate objectives and act in the best interests 
of the MNC as a whole. However, we know that subsidiaries engage in rent-seeking (Mudambi 
and Navarro, 2004).  This begs the question of when is bargaining power truly needed? This paper 
argues that bargaining power is needed only when, during interaction, the utilities of the interacting 
actors differ in direction. Otherwise, bargaining power is immaterial and irrelevant as a concept. 
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 It is important to recall that, at the local threshold, so too was the subsidiary’s bargaining 
power zero.  As demonstrated in figure 3: up until the local threshold, the utilities of the MNC and 
the focal subsidiary increase in the same direction, meaning bargaining power was a moot point 
since there was nothing over which to bargain. However, beyond the local threshold and towards 
the global threshold, critical knowledge transfer to the MNC declined, and only then did bargaining 
power materialize and become relevant. That is because, beyond the local threshold, the utilities 
of the subsidiary and the MNC go from increasing in the same direction to increasing in opposing 
directions. In fact, the HQ only gains bargaining power as a result of subsidiary rent-seeking 
whereby less critical knowledge transferred back to the MNC causing the focal subunit’s internal 
power to decline. The HQ’s focus is on ensuring a common MNC strategy and on the wider 
applicability of the knowledge being transferred back to the MNC by its externally embedded 
subsidiaries (Andersson et al., 2015; Tavani et al. 2014). Therefore, the HQ minimizing its own 
bargaining power is akin to rendering it unnecessary for it to have bargaining power in the first 
place since its utility would be maximized because knowledge transfer, which it coordinates, 
would also be maximized. In fact, bargaining power is an externality on the HQ’s utility. We can 
thus conceptualize the HQ’s utility, or total power, as being equal to fiat power plus resource-
coordination power (holistic value-added)41 minus bargaining power. We therefore argue, 
counterintuitively, that the HQ seek to minimize its bargaining power vis-à-vis the focal subunit. 
Discussion 
 
Summary 
We depicted subsidiary embeddedness decisions as being a function of power accrued in 
both the external and internal markets, where it seeks to maximize total power, not just internal 
                                                                
41 The HQ should be adding value above and beyond the sum of the contributed values of the individual subunits that make up the MNC, otherwise 
the HQ’s existence is called into question. In other words, the whole should be greater than the sum of the parts. 
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power, on which the existing literature has thus far exclusively focused. The subsidiary derives 
greater utility from focusing on external power dynamics rather than internal ones because external 
relationships secure a path to resources over which the HQ does not possess fiat power. 
Subsequently, we showed that only when actors’ utility functions increase in opposing directions 
does bargaining power materialize and become relevant. Lastly, our model showed that the HQ 
seeks to minimize its bargaining power, which is tantamount to eliminating subsidiary rent-
seeking. 
Limitations and Future Research direction 
Implicit in our conceptual model is a 1:1 ratio between HQ and subsidiary bargaining 
power. Since power is relative, power accrued to the subsidiary from embedding at the global 
threshold can be conceptualized as a corresponding loss in power to the HQ (because it coordinates 
less knowledge). However, if the ratio of HQ power to subsidiary power is not at parity, then there 
should be caution in conclusions reached about how much power the HQ has subsequently lost or 
gained as a result of subsidiary embeddedness decisions. For example, if the power conversion 
ratio were 1:2 in favor of the HQ, then the subsidiary would need to gain twice as much power as 
the HQ loses in order to see a gain in [relative] power, and thus our graphs would not fully capture 
the tradeoffs to scale. However, it must be crucially pointed out that our model does not attempt 
to make a prediction as to who would win out in the bargaining process.42 
Furthermore, the paper does list a number of assumptions in the model, some of which may 
seem strong. However, great care was taken in assessing the reasonableness of such assumptions 
in extensive discussions with both academics and top-level executives. First, our assumption of 
                                                                
42 Our model is not a predictive model, it is a snapshot of different possible outcomes. The subsidiary can be anywhere along the total power 
curve up to the global threshold, with its corresponding internal power & resource transfer level both represented along the yellow dotted curve. 
We do not claim that all subsidiaries end up maximizing power, or exhibit goal incongruences with the HQ. Nor do we take a position on what 
the HQ might do when the subsidiary does go beyond the local threshold; it is entirely plausible that the HQ does not exert control for various 
reasons. Having bargaining power does not imply one will use it (Dörrenbacher & Gammelgaard, 2016; Lukes, 2005). 
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MNCs being an interorganizational network allows for the possibility of a powerful subsidiary 
emerging but management’s limited cognitive prevents infinite power accumulation (i.e. 
curvilinear shape of the paper’s figures). Second, the parsing of subsidiary power into internal and 
external allows for the possibility that the subunit has considerations other than internal relations, 
namely external ones.  Third, the fact of an HQs irrevocable fiat power explains why a subunit 
favors external power over internal power: external power is based on resources beyond the HQ’s 
reach. Thus, we believe that while there are winding details, the model’s conceptualization is 
novel, relevant, and empirically testable. The model also responds to a critical need for more 
visualizations that capture power dynamics (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008). From this paper, 
there are a number of interesting theoretical and empirical research directions going forward. 
Naturally, the assumptions on which this paper’s conceptualization are based can be 
empirically tested. The paper’s central theory is that a subunit allowing knowledge transfer, and 
by extension its internal power, to decline is doing so because it is gaining influence in its external 
relations, and external power is preferred to internal power because it is derived from controlling 
resources beyond the reach of the HQ’s fiat power. Therefore, future research would do well to, in 
addition to internal relations, expand its focus to include power dynamics between the focal subunit 
and its external partners. Specifically, to confirm this paper’s theory researchers would have to 
find that subunits that allow knowledge transfer, and by extension their influence within the MNC, 
to decline, are doing so because they are gaining influence over external partners. This could allow 
greater insight into subsidiary decision-making as well as into HQ-subsidiary relationships, from 
a perspective of resource control and power dynamics. In addition, it would confirm the inherent 
tradeoffs that are present between internal and external embeddedness.  
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In addition, another future direction implicit from this paper’s model is towards conceptual 
drivers of spinoffs. For example, if the focal subsidiary has attained maximum power while 
simultaneously having zero internal power, then it has essentially nothing more to lose internally, 
and conditions within the internal market do not at all figure into its utility-based decisions. At the 
same time, the MNC is not gaining any knowledge from the focal subunit, so its competitive 
advantage completely ceases to depend on the focal subunit. A firm’s previous and current ties 
provide opportunity for future interaction because repeated transfers of exchange in information, 
services, and personnel bring about mutual adjustments and thus create a web of economic 
interdependencies that facilitate further cooperation (Dacin et al., 1999). Therefore, we believe 
that further external embeddedness coupled with zero internal power would create strong 
incentives for the subsidiary to want to spinoff. Employing our model to conceptualize such a 
scenario could pave the way to better capturing the forces behind spinoffs.  
Revisiting power and profit maximization in our paper 
Power in RDT is much less about ‘power hunger’ and much more about achieving stability 
(Oliver, 1991). The theory focuses much more on reducing uncertainty by accumulating critical 
resources rather than on accumulating power for the sake of becoming powerful and mighty. It is 
a strategic response to uncertainty. In RDT, there is nothing necessarily precluding a firm who 
seeks power from also seeking to maximize profits. In fact, it is entirely plausible to seek power 
(i.e. strategic resource accumulation) in order to maximize profits. Utility in terms of power (i.e. 
strategic resource accumulation for the purposes of uncertainty reduction) allows for the possibility 
(though not for the inevitability) that the HQ and subsidiary exhibit opposing utility functions. 
There is nothing in our model that is necessarily inconsistent with profit-maximization. 
Our model in fact allows for the free interpretation of all other potentially pertinent considerations, 
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and combinations thereof (e.g. profit-maximization, sustainability, legitimacy etc.), namely, in the 
first constraint of the optimization problem. In other words, although the subsidiary’s ultimate 
problem is the optimization of its power relations between the internal and external markets, this 
is subject, in part, to the subsidiary choosing to receive signals concerning internal and external 
network conditions. One may freely interpret the model as saying, for example, that when 
information related to profit-maximization is more important in the external market, it focuses 
more on maximizing its power (i.e. gaining control of strategic resources) in the external market 
rather than in the internal market. In short, the first constraint in our model can be freely interpreted 
as capturing a subsidiary’s consideration of a slew of [non-power] factors as it optimizes its power 
between the internal and external markets. These factors can include profits, sustainability, 
legitimacy etc. The topic of legitimacy in the context of this paper presents an opportunity to 
broaden and enrichen its contribution, and will thus be presently delved into further. 
Implications for Management 
To be clear, legitimacy attainment was one of the strategies for managing dependencies 
outlined in Pfeffer and Salancik’s original 1978 work on RDT, specifically in chapter seven. 
Subsidiaries, even peripheral ones, gain power through their ability to help the MNC deal with 
critical legitimacy issues (Dörrenbacher & Gammelgaard, 2016; Hart and Sharma, 2004). One 
such way is through relations with local institutions (Hillman and Wan, 2005) which can pave the 
way for the subsidiary to pressure the HQ (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008; Clark and Geppert, 
2011). One example of this is the British and German subsidiaries of Ruberoid which unilaterally 
severed all ties with the parent and, with the support of local financial institutions, ultimately 
secured complete legal independence. Another example is the Australian subsidiary of Ericsson 
which amassed a very high level of R&D resources mainly because its local management formed 
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a coalition with the Australian Post and Telegraph authorities that worked to create a major R&D 
center in Australia (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990). Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) Australia funded 
initiatives from local venture capitalists rather than from the MNC that eventually led to a 
management buyout (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008). 
One important management implication of the need for legitimacy is political strategies of 
firms, and their subsidiaries. Governments pose a great deal of uncertainty for firms due to the fact 
that they control critical resources and hold final say in affairs that shape the local economic and 
competitive landscape (Baron, 1995; Jacobson et al., 1993). As a result, many firms implement 
political strategies to influence public policy (Baysinger, 1984). This would include attempts to 
create a new, more favorable environment by establishing, altering, or dismantling government 
regulations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In fact, regulations were one of the three pillars of 
isomorphism to which Scott (1995) argued firms must adhere in order to gain external legitimacy.43 
When the success of the MNC is closely tied to subsidiaries dispersed around the world, 
the relationships with local entities become indispensable for the purposes of legitimacy (Hillman 
and Wan, 2005). Researchers have defined legitimacy as the perception or assumption of desirable 
or appropriate actions within a social system of norms, values and beliefs (Suchman, 1995). In 
other words, legitimacy is a sort of social approval (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008). Legitimacy 
can be seen as a source of power (Dörrenbacher & Gammelgaard, 2016; Rosenzweig and Singh, 
1991). For larger organizations, such as the MNCs alluded to in this paper, this holds even more 
importance. Owed to their size, large organizations attract more scrutiny and this poses critical 
challenges to their legitimacy and reputation (Fombrun, 1996; Suchman, 1995). Thus, large 
subsidiaries, as part of their strategy for external legitimacy, are highly likely to find themselves 
                                                                
43 This pillar is concerned with the laws and rules of the local environment. 
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engaged in campaigns of influence over political and public opinion. This is tied to the fact that 
large corporations have substantial investments that incentivize them to exercise political strategy 
to ensure interests are protected (Vernon, 1971). Adding to the urgency is the fact that these 
subsidiaries are part of a foreign corporation, and there is a liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995), 
that makes it an easy target for protectionist, populist or opportunistic politicians. 
Other reasons for engaging in political activity relate to competitive advantages, which are, 
as previously argued in this paper, based on intangible assets (Hillman and Wan, 2005).  Many 
countries have inadequate intellectual property rights protection, exposing firms in a way that 
could have a strong ripple effect on its worldwide operations. Thus, firms are heavily incentivized 
to pursue political strategies promoting intellectual property rights. Further, global MNCs operate 
across jurisdictions to which they are legally accountable; therefore, it is in the MNC’s best interest 
that there be a common global standard of laws and regulations across these jurisdictions. To that 
end, the MNC would lobby for global standard practices that would allow synergies and cost-
savings. 
As such, attempts at political strategy could easily be one of the main drivers of goal 
incongruences between the focal subunit and the MNC. Subunits face both internal and external 
legitimacy pressures in what is called ‘institutional duality’ (Kostova and Roth, 2002) and both 
sorts of legitimacy are necessary because the survival of the MNC depends on continued support 
from the local environment as well as from the HQ (Hillman and Wan, 2005). However, external 
embeddedness can be complicated by the presence of corruption in the foreign country of 
operations where the subunit is present. Spencer and Gomez (2011) show that there is a positive 
relationship between the corruption level in a subsidiary’s local environment and the pressure the 
subunit faced to commit bribery. Indeed, the inclination to bribe is a function of the firm’s 
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vulnerability and exposure to government officials and corruption (Lee et al., 2010). The 
consequences of this can, of course, hurt efficiency and profitability. First, corruption creates 
distortionary outcomes because bribery money is in fact an inefficiently allocated resource 
(Goudie and Stasavage, 1997). Second, the penalties levied are hefty and have been previously 
underestimated. For example, Sampath, Gardberg and Rahman (2016), using a residual approach, 
partitioned share value losses into regulatory penalties, class action settlements, and loss to 
reputation, finding that reputational penalties account for 81.8¢ of every dollar of share value loss. 
The authors conclude that omission of these reputational penalties has caused researchers to 
underestimate true bribery costs by 4.5 times. Management must therefore value reputation for 
what it is: a unique and inimitable intangible asset (Fombrun and Van Riel 2004) that in fact 
procures a sustainable competitive advantage for the firm (Roberts and Dowling 2002; Shamsie, 
2003).  
Conclusion 
Our conceptualizations provide managers and researchers with a more holistic and accurate 
way of using RDT to examine strategic decisions made by subsidiaries and HQs, decisions that 
have ramifications for the resource configuration and balance of power within firms. In addition, 
in synthesizing management and economic theories, we have challenged conventional wisdom 
concerning HQ bargaining power. We believe our theoretical framework should open up the 
literature to a more holistic empirical approach, in measuring subsidiary power, which will 
strengthen the field’s understanding of HQ-Subsidiary relations. This of course did require a 
recalibration and elaboration of RDT, but one that we believe to be very much in the spirit of the 
theory yet harnesses its true potential. The purpose of the paper is not to use RDT to the exclusion 
of any other theory; to the contrary, we believe that our efforts here could contribute to theory 
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development elsewhere that could complement or challenge our notions, both of which we 
welcome. 
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Appendix A (Derivation of Information Flow Equation) 
 
The entropy of a single random variable, say X, that has a normal distribution with variance σ2 is 
H (X) = 
1
2
log2 2πeσ
2 
In the case of a vector with a multivariate normal distribution, the entropy becomes 
H (X’) = 
1
2
log2(2πe)
𝑇 𝐝𝐞𝐭 Ω ,               [1] 
where Ω is the covariance matrix of the random variables in the vector, and ‘det’ is the 
determinant, which represents the quantity equaling the sum product of the elements of a square 
matrix, according to a given rule. 
Conditional uncertainty can be measured by conditional entropy. With a multivariate normal 
distribution, conditional entropy is 
H (X | Y) = 
1
2
log2(2πe)
𝑇 𝐝𝐞𝐭 ΩX | Y ,               [2] 
Now that we have determined measurements for uncertainty as well as for conditional uncertainty, 
we can combine them to illustrate one random vector (Y) containing information about another 
random vector (X):  
𝐼(X | Y) = 𝐻(𝑋) − 𝐻(X | Y)                    [1] - [2] 
Furthermore, we can model this as a stochastic process whereby future sequences cannot be 
ascertained with probability 1. Stochasticity is apropos in our context since the subsidiary is always 
faced with at least some level of uncertainty due to its environment and limited cognitive ability. 
Put differently, when the development of future states involves at least some randomness, the 
process is stochastic. Let there be T elements in the stochastic processes {𝑋𝑡} and {𝑌𝑡}. The flow 
of information between stochastic processes can be quantified as 
  ({𝑋𝑡; 𝑌𝑡}) = 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑇→∞
1
𝑇 
 I (𝑋1 ,...,𝑋𝑇 ; 𝑌1, ..., 𝑌𝑇)                           [3] 
where operator  measures the information flow between stochastic processes {𝑋𝑡} and { 𝑌𝑡}. 
 
Using substitution, we get 
  ({𝑋𝑡; 𝑌𝑡}) = 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑇→∞
1
𝑇 
 I ( 
1
2
log2(2πe)
𝑇σ𝑥
2  -  
1
2
log2(2πe)
𝑇 σx |y
2  ) 
                     = 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑇→∞
1
𝑇 
 𝐼( 𝑇
1
2
log2(2πe)σ𝑥
2 −  𝑇 
1
2
log2(2πe) σx |y
2  ) 
                     =   
1
2
log2(2πe)σ𝑥
2 −  
1
2
log2(2πe) σx |y
2   
        = 
 1
2
𝑙𝑜𝑔2(
2𝜋𝑒𝜎𝑥
2
2𝜋𝑒𝜎𝑥 |𝑦
2  
)    
Finally, as (𝑋𝑡, 𝑌𝑡) exhibits a multivariate normal distribution, the following property holds: 
σx |y
2  = σx 
2  - ρx |y
2 * σx 
2   
It then follows that the flow of information between processes 𝑌𝑡 and 𝑋𝑡 is 
  ({𝑋𝑡; 𝑌𝑡}) =  
1
2
𝑙𝑜𝑔2(
1
1−ρx |y
2  
)  
 
Appendix B (Subsidiary Utility Function) 
 
𝛦(μ) = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 = 𝑓(𝑋𝑡; 𝑌𝑡)- λ* ρx |y
2  
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The subsidiary’s utility function is its total power which is equal to some function of the power it 
accumulates in the internal market, 𝑋𝑡 , and the external market, 𝑌𝑡, minus its risk aversion (λ) 
times the complexity of its relations (ρx |y
2 ). The first term is capturing the benefits of external 
embeddedness, namely that the subsidiary obtains power in the external market because the 
external market provides the focal subunit with resources that are beyond the control of the HQ. 
The second term captures the tradeoff between external embeddedness and internal embeddedness. 
That is the subsidiary must be assumed to be risk averse44, that is, λ >0, else the subsidiary could 
just infinitely increase its power by simply continuing to externally embed. Risk aversion can the 
thought of as the inverse of innate ability, specifically, cognitive ability, κ, from the first constraint 
of the optimization problem45. The complexity term captures the extent of correlations of 
interrelations (between external and internal markets) but also of intra-relations (within, each, the 
internal and external market). As previously argued, and a notion well established in management 
and economics literature, complexity renders decisions more difficult because of limited cognitive 
abilities. The subsidiary is unable to infinitely increase its power by simply externally embedding 
because, as it externally embeds, it develops more relations and those relations have relations and 
so it become increasingly difficult to manage all relations- this is why its power declines at 
particular levels of embeddedness.
                                                                
44 The assumption of risk aversion is standard in economics for one simple reason: in reality, people tend to be risk averse. 
45 Therefore, λ =1/ κ 
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CHAPTER 4: THE PROFITS OF ENTERPRISE: WHY AND HOW RISK AND  
                         UNCERTAINTY COMPENSATE DIFFERENTLY 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The literature on the theory of the firm has imprudently used the terms ‘uncertainty’ 
and ‘risk’ interchangeably, often referring to contractual hazards as an ‘uncertainty’ and then 
proxying them with what are effectively risk metrics such as variation of sales. Indeed, the 
concept of uncertainty, owed to its measurement difficulty, was largely abandoned in favor of 
the easier to measure concept of risk. Nevertheless, risk and uncertainty are two concepts that 
must be crucially distinguished from one another because, as this paper will argue and support 
empirically, they compensate investors differently for assuming them. Risk being situations in 
which we can rely on objective probabilities and thus eliminate, and uncertainty being 
situations in which probabilities are meaningless and so we must defer to own intuition and 
judgement. Drawing on a sample of 114 firms and 10,500 observations over a 23-year quarterly 
period, I find that investors are rewarded for assuming uncertainty and punished for assuming 
risk. These findings are also discussed in the context of routine responsibility for which wages 
are earned, and ultimate responsibility for which profits are gained. 
 
Keywords:  
Risk, Uncertainty, Theory of the firm, Diversification, Theory of Profit, Ultimate 
Responsibility, Routine Responsibility, Organizational and Environmental Change 
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Introduction 
The literature on the theory of the firm is composed of a vast, rich and diverse array of 
explanations for what determines the boundaries of the firm. Transaction cost economics 
(TCE), property rights theory (PRT)46, Principal-agent theory (PAT), Behavioral theory47, team 
production48, among others, have all contributed enormously to our understanding of the 
determinants of firm boundaries. Critical to these theories has been their shared notion that 
whenever there is a sufficiently high hazard or contingency stemming from a transaction or 
relationship with the market, then the prerequisites for eliminating the market transaction and 
absorbing the transactional asset within the confines of the firm have been established. The 
hazard or contingency can be derived from situations such as asset specificity, importance of 
investments, distorted incentives or, in general, asymmetric information. However, a subtle yet 
critical omission in this literature is whether this hazard is a situation of risk or uncertainty, two 
terms which have been used interchangeably in empirical work (Klein, 2005), and this has left 
a void in understanding how the two may affect a firm and its stakeholders differently, if at all. 
In Knightian fashion, this paper will argue the importance of distinguishing between 
risk and [true] uncertainty precisely because they lead to different predictions with respect to 
firm profitability. To this end, the following research question is proposed: why are risky assets 
pooled in firms? 
I argue that firms pool risky assets because, when confronted with a variable 
environment, they are able to 1) realize the benefits of asset diversification and 2) earn a profit 
on the assets for assuming uncertainty, which this paper defines as the probability of these 
diversified assets within the firm suddenly becoming undiversified. Empirically, the two 
aforementioned notions of diversification benefits and asset profitability are tested on a sample 
                                                                
46 Incomplete contracting paradigm. 
47 Simon 1962’s argument that the hierarchy (the firm) is the most understandable form of a complex system in that it is not beyond our 
bounded rationality. 
48 Alchian & Demsetz 1972 
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of 114 firms from the S&P Index over a 23-year quarterly period. I argue and employ beta as 
a proxy for true uncertainty whereas the standard deviation of stock returns is used as a proxy 
for risk. Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) are used as profit metrics. The 
findings show that beta has a positive and significant impact on ROA but no such impact on 
ROE, implying that investors are compensated for owning assets that may suddenly become 
undiversified rather than for merely investing money. Furthermore, the results show that 
assuming risk harms profitability, suggesting that investors are incentivized to diversify since 
risk, or return volatility, can always be reduced through diversification. As such, the results 
point to the need for a distinction between risk and true uncertainty as compensation for 
assuming responsibility for them are fundamentally different in nature. This distinction in 
compensation will feature prominently in the paper’s managerial section as the distinction 
between wages, earned for assuming routine responsibility, and pure profits, earned for 
assuming ultimate responsibility; this discussion is a further contribution of the paper since the 
institutional and decision-theoretical implications of diversification have not been fully 
investigated (Skogh and Wu, 2005). 
The rest of the paper is as follows. First, I will give an overview of the main 
contributions to the theory of the firm. Second, the common notion of a contractual hazard or 
contingency across these theories is discussed. In the third section, I detail the difference 
between risk and true uncertainty. Fourth, the paper argues beta as a strong proxy for true 
uncertainty. Fifth, the paper’s empirical findings are presented and discussed. Sixth, summary 
arguments, limitations and promising future direction, as well as managerial implications are 
detailed. 
The theory of the firm 
Coase (1937) introduced the notion of transaction costs to both modes of governance- 
hierarchy and markets- arguing that deciding which of the two modes of governance to use 
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should be derived rather than taken as given. As such, TCE holds that different kinds of 
transactions (underlain by either generic or specific assets) are more efficiently governed by 
different modes of governance (hierarchy or market). If the transaction is supported by generic 
assets, then market governance suffices; if the transactions are underlain by specific assets49 
then the hierarchy mode of governance (a firm) is more efficient the market. 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) looked at why a team process induces the contractual form 
called ‘the firm’. Two necessary conditions for its emergence are 1) synergies are achievable 
through team production, which is costly to directly monitor50, and 2) it is economical to 
observe input behavior in order to measure marginal productivity and thus avoid metering and 
shirking problems. Thus, the firm enhances the efficiency of an organization in a way that 
simple markets cannot. 
PRT focuses exclusively on ex-ante underinvestment in relationship-specific human 
capital brought about by inefficient ownership arrangements (e.g. Grossman and Hart, 1986; 
Hart and Moore, 1990; Holmstrom and Milgrom,1991, 1994). Therefore, of importance for 
PRT is the role of asset ownership as a way to allocate residual rights of control. According to 
the theory, the party for which the investment is more important should own the asset, 
complementary assets should always be owned by the same party, and independent assets 
should be owned separately (Hart, 1995).  
Holmstrom (1999) examines why it is that firms own essentially all of the productive 
assets they deploy, arguing the reason is because it allows the firm to define the rules and set 
incentive structures such that contractual externalities stemming from imperfect information 
are internalized. In other words, in a world of imperfect information, firms use low-powered 
incentives and narrow job designs to encourage cooperation when it is compromised by 
excessively strong market incentives.  
                                                                
49 Specific assets are not re-deployable without at least some loss in productive value. 
50 Making it difficult to reduce shirking through simple market exchange. 
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A recurring central notion: Contractual Hazards 
Although distinct in their contributions, the literature tackling the theory of the firm has 
essentially made predictions about firm boundaries in situations where contractual hazards 
arise. The exact nature of the hazard has varied in the literature, but they all revolve around a 
blurred distinction between risk and uncertainty. TCE holds that the more specific an asset is, 
the harder it is to replace the exchange partner in the event of disagreement, therefore the more 
uncertain one’s future state of the world is because there are fewer outside options. Similarly, 
PRT’s argument that the party, whose investment is more important, should have ownership 
can also be argued to reflect uncertainty.51 The more one party invests in a given relationship, 
the greater uncertainty they face because they are effectively more tied to the success of the 
relationship or, in other words, to the whims of the other party. Holmstrom (1999) argued that 
the tendency of firms, rather than employees, to own assets was due to uncertainty arising from 
imperfect information (i.e. worker can manipulate effort creating inefficiencies). Hart and 
Moore (2008) presented a novel model in which ex-post performance depends on whether a 
party receives what they’re entitled to relative to the uncertain outcomes permitted by the 
contract. Hart (2009) then comes back to this point of uncertainty, specifically payoff 
uncertainty, arguing that an asset should be allocated to the party whose payoffs are more 
uncertain since asset allocation enhances a party’s outside option, making it more difficult for 
the counterparty to holdup. 
Although they share a common underlying premise- contractual hazards within 
relationships of economic exchange- in their predictions, problematic is that much of the 
literature on the theory of the firm has not considered the difference between uncertainty and 
risk. The literature often loosely refers to the hazard as an ‘uncertainty’ in the theoretical sense 
and then crudely proxies it through metrics such as variation of sales (Klein, 2005). However, 
                                                                
51 PRT is a generally considered a collective of Grossman and Hart (1986) & Hart and Moore (1990) (Hart, 2017). 
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and importantly so, variation, or standard deviation of any sort of returns to a firm, is a measure 
of its idiosyncratic risk and not the uncertainty it faces. In this paper, the standard deviation of 
firm returns will be properly employed as a proxy for risk, not uncertainty. In fact, the concept 
of “uncertainty”, owed to its measurement difficulty (Downey & Slocum, 1975), was largely 
abandoned in favor of the easier to measure concept of “risk” (Milliken, 1987). Nevertheless, 
risk and uncertainty are two concepts that must be crucially distinguished from one another. 
Due to the imprudent common usage of the two terms in an interchangeable manner, this paper 
differentiates between the two words as risk on the one hand and true uncertainty on the other. 
To be sure, their difference reaches down to the very foundations of our thinking, and 
depending on which of the two is at play, there are far-reaching and critical consequences. 
Distinguishing between risk and uncertainty 
Knight (1921) argued that there was a fatal ambiguity in the terms uncertainty and risk 
which must be gotten rid of, and that the use of the term risk in connection with the measurable 
probabilities of insurance gave some justification for specializing risk as objectively 
measurable and true uncertainty as subjectively measurable. Measurability is contingent on the 
possibility of grouping, or classifying, a given situation with a set of similars, and finding the 
proportions of the members of the group that are thought to exhibit the various possible 
outcomes. Fundamental to classification is the notion that not only must it be possible that the 
same thing always behaves in the same way, but that anything of the same kind will also behave 
in that way. It must also be true that there is a finite, manageable number of kinds of things in 
the sense that their properties are not stochastically associated, but that rather some level of 
consistency in their association exists. A crucial consequence of an occurrence exhibiting a 
high degree of consistency is that it is expected or predictable and, as such, has no significant 
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influence on its distribution of income.52 Such would be a situation of risk, as it is defined in 
this paper. 
By contrast, under true uncertainty, the instance does not occur frequently enough for 
a known probability distribution to be associated with it, and thus there is ‘no valid basis for 
classifying instances’ (Knight, 1921).53 There are two different valid methods of probability 
judgment: mathematical and empirical. The first type is driven by the theory of permutations 
and combinations where possible groupings of equally probable alternatives are determined. 
Necessary in this sort of calculation is the perfect homogeneity of the grouped instances, where 
any differences between them are purely indeterminate. However, as the number of factors to 
be considered increase, the mathematical method becomes unmanageable, prone to error, and 
the loss of generality in the results outweigh any gains from a closer approximation. Thus, it 
becomes necessary to approximate using empirics. Through empirics, we cannot, as we can in 
the first, calculate the true probability from collected data, but must approximate it from an 
inductive study of a large group of cases or observations.  
The throwing of a fair die illustrates the appropriateness of applicability of each 
methodology. It would be pointless to roll the die many times in order to procure the probability 
of it landing on one side or another. The probability distribution of outcomes given any number 
of rolls can be mathematically calculated. Conducting a statistical experiment to reach this 
probability would be an exercise in futility since no finite number of trials could give certainty 
to the probability distribution. That is, the actual, or true, probability would remain elusive if 
the method of statistics were to be applied in the case of rolling a fair die. However, if the 
                                                                
52 This treatment of a known loss being treated as a cost rather than as a loss is evident in other literatures. Sampath et. al (2016)’s paper in 
the Journal of Business Ethics uses the residual approach in examining how accusations of misconduct affect investors. Under the approach, 
total dollar loss in share value is first calculated and then subtracted are regulator-imposed legal penalties, class action settlements, and other 
applicable direct costs. The idea is that investors would rationally expect firms to incur these penalties and costs when the news of the firm’s 
misconduct becomes public, so its not assessed as part of their losses.  
53 Knight’s use of the term ‘classify’ is a reference to probabilistic classification, that is, assigning probabilities. His point, however, centers 
on the validity of such an assignment of probabilities, not on whether one can actually assign probabilities to instances, pointing out that since 
nothing is absolutely unique any more than any two things are absolutely alike, it is always possible to form classes if the standards are lowered 
and a loose enough interpretation of similarity is permitted. 
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situation at hand was the chance that a house will burn down, it would be as much an exercise 
in futility to attempt to calculate the probability mathematically, of the proportion of homes 
that would catch fire in a given area and time, as it would be applying statistics to calculate 
rolling dice.  
Indeed, the difference between mathematical and statistical probability is the accuracy 
involved in classifying instances grouped together. The instances of throwing dice, for 
example, are thought to be sufficiently homogenous to an extent and fashion certainly not 
afforded to instances of homes burning down; one in six is the real, or true, probability 
irrespective of the outcome in any given throw of a die, but the chance of a fire at a home 
cannot be claimed to hold any true or definite probability. The first probability, the 
mathematical one, is an apodictic certainty, whereas in the case of the fire, it would be an 
empirical generalization. Nevertheless, it is precisely in situations of risk that the distribution 
of the outcomes of a group of instances is known either mathematically or from statistics of 
past experience. 
By contrast, in situations of true uncertainty it would be impossible to form a group of 
sufficiently homogenous instances since the situation at hand is highly unique, and as such we 
defer to estimates. Estimates have the same form as a probability but any attempt at equating 
the two would be extremely flawed. For example, a firm that is contemplating expanding 
operations abroad would see its management consider various measurable factors and metrics, 
but the end result would be some estimate of the probable outcome of any decision taken54. It 
would make little sense to attempt to calculate the mathematical or statistical probability of this 
instance, precisely because it is so unique that there almost certainly be nothing like it or at 
least, a sufficient number of alike cases, to form a basis for any serious inference about the real 
                                                                
54 If that very decision were to be taken many times over. 
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probability. This is a general fact of decisions made in everyday life, not just in business 
decisions. 
The role of exact science in everyday life 
The exact science of inference has little weight in forming the opinions on which our 
decisions in everyday life are based. Rather than exhaustive analysis we mostly act on estimates 
or judgments because we accept that the future depends on a sufficiently large number of 
factors and so no reasonable effort, on our part, is made to consider all of them. As humans, 
we task ourselves with simplifying complex webs of relationships, which is done by separating 
them into uniform elements that are analyzable in a way such that we are able to reach our 
ultimate goal in knowledge procurement: having laws or principles that govern the way we 
understand behaviors. Such is the analytic treatment that defines the very concept of exact 
science; and analytic treatment is, to a great extent, abstraction because its application is 
necessarily non-universal or incomplete, owed to the sheer complexity and number of factors 
involved in nature. However, the advantage of the method is its reliance on the reality that, in 
a large group of cases, certain important tendencies among factors are common in each case 
and are not cognitively cumbersome in number. What’s more is that the laws or principles 
governing these particular factors allow us to approximate as much to the entire situation in 
general. In other words, we are able to know what tends to happen in simplified conditions, 
that is, in the absence of the numerous and less important factors, which our laws or principles 
do not take into account. It is only by the discarding of the numerous and relatively less 
important factors of a situation that we obtain laws or principles of behaviors in a general sense, 
allowing ourselves to tackle practical problems intelligently because our laws and principles 
are approximately true and we become adept at discounting them on the basis of their 
incompleteness (Knight, 1921).55 As such, approximations, or estimates, of situations by 
                                                                
55 Discounting the incompleteness of laws or principles is the same notion as being able to judge the accuracy of one’s estimates.  
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dealing with the more important and general elements of a situation are truly the only reason 
how we, as humans, have ever amassed even a semblance of intelligent understanding of 
behaviors, accounting for our impressive grasp of the forces of nature in our world, a world as 
venturesome as it is uncertain. 
It is thus no wonder that the ability to form correct estimates, judgments or opinions is 
the determining attribute of serviceability in industry. And although we estimate outcomes, we 
also estimate the accuracy of our estimate because, in the absence of exact scientific 
methodology, the chance of error is amplified. In other words, the economic actor not only 
estimates outcomes of their decisions, but they also estimate the probability that their estimate 
is in fact correct. The importance of this cannot be understated since one’s action pursuant to 
an estimate depends as much on the level of confidence one has in that estimate as it does on 
the favorability of the estimate being true. In fact, humans do tend to form, over time, accurate 
inferences regarding their own ability, the ability of others, or of others’ ability to do the same 
(Knight, 1921). This is in fact a sort of probability judgment in the sense that it is based on 
“tabulated” past experiences, but nonetheless must not be favorably equated with actual 
statistical methodology, a methodology inherently tied to the principle of insurance.56 
The principle of insurance 
Insurance illustrates the principle of eliminating risk by dealing with groups of cases 
instead of individual cases (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This principle need not in any way 
be restricted to the insurance industry. In fact, organized economic activity is fundamentally 
about the production of goods by producers to satisfy the wants of consumers, but a closer 
examination of who, producers or consumers, does the forecasting of the future demand goes 
to the heart of the insurance principle. It would seem somewhat obvious that the consumer 
would be able to much better anticipate their own demand than for a producer to do it for them, 
                                                                
56 The mere tendency to do something versus always doing it with constancy is an important distinction that is essentially the difference 
between equilibrium and actual outcomes. Tendency, as opposed to constancy, is the result of true uncertainty. 
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but this is not observed anywhere in business.  It is a matter of fact that economic organization 
is centered around producing goods for a whole market rather than at the behest of any 
consumer, who generally does not contract for the production of goods in advance. No 
consumer writes a contract with their local supermarket or car manufacturer for goods to be 
produced at a future point in time at which the consumer pays. The reason is due to the 
consumer not knowing what they really want, the extent to which they want it, or how much 
of it; so it becomes incumbent on the producer to make impersonal predictions, produce the 
goods and then ready them for when the consumer’s decision is eventually brought to fruition. 
What appears, at first, to be a perplexing phenomenon- a producer anticipating, for a consumer, 
what they want- is in fact nothing more than the consolidation of risks, that is, the application 
of the insurance principle. The consumer is, to himself or herself, only one, but to the producer, 
the consumer is one of many, and so idiosyncrasy, and whatever risks it carries, is obliterated.  
Insurance firms deal with cases that are reasonably classifiable and exhibit a low degree 
of idiosyncrasy. However, the different branches of the insurance industry illustrate the breadth 
of accuracy in probability measurement that they are able to obtain. Life insurance represents 
the branch of insurance, acting on near-known risk probabilities owed to its sophisticated 
development. The reason its contingencies are so accurately measured may be explained by 
considering two individuals in good health. If they are in similar circumstances, the probability 
of their deaths would be near parity, and where the death of one but not the other would be 
almost as conceivably indeterminate as possible. Business risk is not of this [perfectly 
homogenous] nature, and the branch of insurance that most illustrates this is fire insurance. As 
previously argued, the chance of a fire breaking out at a particular establishment holds no true 
or definite probability. This problem of uniqueness is further compounded by the complication 
that the outcomes involved after the outset of a fire are not independent since once a fire breaks 
out, it spreads to other things indiscriminately and these “other things” tend to be unique to the 
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business. Consequently, this branch of insurance does not cover against all loss due to a fire. 
Coverage is limited to, at most, “direct losses” as it would be unthinkable that indirect losses, 
such as interruption of business operation, would form part of the covered contingency since 
there wouldn’t be a sufficient number of homogenous instances to obtain a valid probability of 
the outcome. It is precisely this type of uncertainty that is true uncertainty since it is not 
susceptible to [valid] measurement and hence to elimination (Knight, 1921). By contrast, any 
individual situation with a known risk can be converted into effective certainty because, when 
grouped with a substantial number of similar cases, the outcomes are predictable in a manner 
consistent with the laws of chance, and any error ascribed to the prediction approaches zero as 
the number of cases increases.  This is the technique of business organization: combine a 
sufficient number of cases such that the risk will be borne in groups large enough so as to be 
reduced to substantially negligible proportions. 
The technique of business organization 
The opportunity to deal with uncertainty through grouping constitutes a strong 
incentive to extend the scale of operations of a business establishment (Knight, 1921). In doing 
so, one extends the scope of their exercise in judgment over a greater number of decisions or 
estimates, and the chances rise that bad estimates will, in aggregate, be neutralized by accurate 
ones, providing a degree of constancy and dependability in the overall outcome. In fact, the 
superiority of the corporation over other forms is partly in its wide scope of operations that 
encompass a larger number of individual decisions, ventures, or, in other words, instances. This 
process is also known as diversification.57 The diversification theorem states that if a risk-
averse individual is given the choice between two assets with identical but random returns, the 
individual would prefer to invest half of the endowment in each asset (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 
                                                                
57Although studies in this tradition within the management literature (i.a Lubatiken Chaterjee, 1994) have shown that high and low “levels” 
of diversification are associated with higher levels of risk, their setup makes a baffling choice in proxy for diversification level, namely that 
of Rumelt’s scheme, which is based on the type of firm diversification rather than the level of diversification. The authors even point this out 
in their own paper (pg. 122).  
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1971). In other words, when facing the same distributions of losses, two identically risk-averse 
individuals would gain by sharing losses equally, a notion fundamental to portfolio theory 
(Skogh and Wu, 2005). 
Diversification allows the pooling of risky assets under one roof and distribute them 
across their operations such that the total outcome, the firm, is not dependent on any one asset 
for success, and so is an outcome that becomes more consistent and dependable. When risk is 
pooled, it is non-additive since the risk of the pool is always necessarily lower than the sum of 
its individual risks. This concept is best exemplified through the risk metric Value-at-Risk 
(VaR) which is non-additive precisely because of the diversification benefit. The economic 
actor who holds, for example, five separate market contracts will necessarily be judged as 
holding more risk than if they were to pool them into one entity; the risk of that “pooled entity” 
will be assessed as lower than individually adding up the risks of the five separate contracts. 
Thus, for the economic actor, holding separate contracts would make little sense because it 
would result in an unfavorable pricing of the risk they hold since each contract would be judged 
as a standalone risk, and added up in a method that ignores the diversification benefit. In short, 
the economic actor avoids unfavorable pricing of the risk they hold by pooling it under one 
entity, namely the firm. 
It is perhaps interesting to then ask what is a firm (or organization) if nothing more than 
a pool of diversified assets? No matter the organization, it can be thought of as an amalgamation 
of risk, or environmental variability, that has been pooled from the market and into one firm. 
These assets can be norms, human capital, activities, investments– any of which, when outside 
of the firm or organization, can be perceived as threats with a certain level of risk, but if this 
risk is measurable, then these “threats” can be neutralized by being absorbed into the firm and 
dispersed within, and so assets that, when relatively uncorrelated, transform that which is risky 
to riskless (or to at least negligibly risky). 
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A highly talented worker or a new technology that are outside of an organization can 
be perceived as potential hazards. That is because the worker or technology can instead by 
leveraged at a competing firm; in this case they would form part of the variable environment 
that unpredictably influences the outcomes of the focal firm. Thus, in assessing whether or not 
to acquire the worker or technology, the focal firm assesses the risk of them remaining outside 
the firm (i.e. not acquiring them) and the benefits of acquiring them given the assets already 
within the firm. The benefit of this goes back to the point made earlier that a wider scope of 
operations entails judgment over a greater number of decisions, where errors in estimates are 
neutralized, in aggregate, by accurate estimates; this creates stability and predictability in 
outcomes. However, a wider scope of operations also entails a greater exposure to the external 
environment. This point of greater exposure to the external environment warrants further 
discussion because of the latent liability associated with it. 
Diversification is never to the point of zero absolute risk because diversification only 
eliminates idiosyncratic risk; there is still a non-diversifiable residual “risk” that remains, and 
it stems not from the nature of a firm’s idiosyncratic operations, but from the market itself. 
This is known as market or systematic risk, and despite the containing the word “risk”- and 
unfortunate symptom of imprudent usage- these two terms represent what this paper stresses 
as [true] uncertainty.58 
Although the technique of business organization takes advantage of the fact that at least 
some variability in the environment can be dealt with by absorbing it into the firm and 
dispersing it throughout such that diversification benefits are realized, this diversification effort 
                                                                
58 Unlike proponents of corporate diversification theory (e.g. Bettis & Hall, 1982; Lubatkin & O'Neill, 1987; Chatterjee & Lubatkin, 1990), 
the position of this paper is that systematic risk cannot be reduced because these are contingencies that cannot, by definition, be anticipated 
ex-ante. The basic argument of these proponents is that business managers, unlike portfolio managers, can actively intervene to influence the 
underlying risk profiles of their various businesses in such a way that the expected variance of the combined return need not be a linear 
extension of historical variances. In other words, the [active] business manager can alter cash flows while [passive] portfolio manager can 
only combine cash flows. First, it is not clear why altering returns is a sufficient condition for reducing systemic risk. In any case, although 
portfolio managers cannot influence the underlying businesses, per se, they don’t need to in order to alter their returns. They simply can create 
any risk profile vis-à-vis any company they desire, synthetically, through a seemingly endless supply of financial derivatives. They do not 
need to passively wait for management to change the business so that their cash flows, from investments in that firm, to be altered. Thus, the 
ability to alter one’s returns is not a sufficient condition, or a defining feature of the ability, to lower systematic risk as the proponents 
erroneously claim. Business mangers cannot lower systematic risk any more than portfolio managers can. 
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is bounded by the cognitive abilities of management. That is, by their ability to objectively 
measure all environmental variability in order to properly absorb it.59 Due to the fact that the 
challenges stay the same for a while or repeat, a fundamental question in organization is how 
can survival prospects be enhanced by exploiting the element of continuity in the environment 
since continuity allows for economies of various sorts (Winter, 2017).60 Factors of production 
tend towards greater economies with an increase in the size of the establishment, and the chief 
limitation on its size is the capacity of its leadership (Knight, 1921). As such, there is an 
associated downside that is just as pervasive as the opportunity to secure economies: that the 
world will change and strand the very investments designed to exploit continuity, leaving the 
firm evolutionarily vulnerable. In other words, while diversification reduces variance, it comes 
with the latent liability of higher correlations to the wider market. Thus, this paper argues that, 
as a firm eliminates risk, it builds up [true] uncertainty through exposure to increasingly opaque 
correlations dispersed throughout the economy, which escape the cognitive abilities of its 
management and are, as such, not subject to elimination.61    
For example, a producer with only one supplier may be heavily dependent on that one 
supplier, but there is relatively little complexity involved since the producer is only dealing 
with one supplier. The producer likely only needs to understand this focal relationship with the 
supplier and perhaps a few immediate relationships the supplier has with others that may affect 
the focal relationship. However, if the producer decides to expand their supplier network to 
include other suppliers then, on the one hand, they would be less dependent on any one supplier 
since they would have a greater number of outside options but, on the other hand, there is a 
greater exposure to the wider economy. That is because peripheral relationships would be 
                                                                
59 Human behavior is intendedly rational, but only limitedly so (Simon, 1961), and so economic actors cannot account for all possible 
contingencies (Chiles and McMackin, 1996). 
60 A stark example of continuity is when in 1979 General Motors wanted to reduce contracting risks through minority equity holdings in a 
supplier base which could provide repetitive systems, seeking what it referred to as ‘continuity and consistency.’ (Argyres, 1995) 
61 Institutional limitations, estimation errors, and transaction costs are among the most cited reasons for the limited diversification observed in 
practice (Rode, 2000). For simplicity this paper refers to all of these as “complexities”, or externalities, that are exacerbated as relationships 
develop with further diversification. 
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increasingly involved, and such relationships increase the complexity involved within the focal 
relationship (Nell and Andersson, 2012), in line with the argument of Tadelis and Williamson 
(2012) that incompleteness is more severe as the number of transaction features and 
consequential impinging disturbances increase. Thus, as diversification increases, so does 
complexity since the web of relationships expands, and consequently assessments of the risks 
involved become increasingly distorted, and thus subjective, due to bounded rationality (i.e. 
incomplete information).  
It is therefore the view of this paper that [true] uncertainty is the probability of 
uncorrelated risks, pooled within a firm, suddenly becoming correlated or undiversified. This 
would be in the form of some exogenous economic shock that occurs where all human capital 
or machinery sync in their inability to resolve the unfolding contingency. This is of course what 
we observe after the onset of such economic shocks: the tendency for all groups to be 
incapacitated in their ability to mitigate the widespread losses amassing. This is a consequence 
of human limited cognitive ability. However, it is precisely this cognitive limitation that 
precludes perfect competition and thus permits the securement of profits for those confident 
enough in their own superior cognitive abilities to assume uncertainty. 
Firm profits 
With uncertainty absent, individuals would possess perfect knowledge, and the notion 
of responsibility for productive activity would lose all meaning. Under a situation of perfect 
knowledge, even if there were high-level executives and managers, these individuals would 
simply be laborers, undertaking banal, routine tasks that involve a level of “responsibility” on 
par with that of a worker at the furthermost bottom of the hierarchy. It is questionable whether 
the concept of intelligence itself would even exist in a world devoid of uncertainty; for in such 
a world adaptation would become perfunctory, bereft of any sort of cumbersomeness on the 
mind. But with uncertainty present - incomplete information necessitating the need to act on 
The profits of enterprise: Why and how risk and uncertainty compensate differently 
 
87 
 
opinion rather than on knowledge- the world is completely changed: it becomes a venture. In 
a venturesome world, uncertainty behooves individuals to dedicate efforts towards deciding 
what to do and how to do it; the subsequent act of executing an activity is reduced to subordinate 
importance. 
Business decisions are in fact made under such venturesome circumstances because 
changes from the variable external environment (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1984; Haveman, 
1992; Oliver, 1991) often bring about situations that are all too unique for mathematics or 
statistics to be useful in determining probabilities; individuals are thus subjected to the liability 
of erring in an unknowable fashion. It is also precisely in these circumstances that profits 
materialize, owed specifically to the fact that contracts for productive services are largely done 
in advance at fixed rates, and unanticipated changes cause an imbalance between costs and 
price, which would otherwise be paired through competitive forces that, when unhindered, 
erase profits nearly as fast as they are created.62 It is this true uncertainty which, by driving a 
disturbance in the balance normally brought about from competitive forces, accords the 
distinction of "enterprise” to economic organization, a deciding factor in the existence of 
profits. The enterprising nature of our world forces economic actors to rely on estimates, where 
the stability and success of businesses is largely dependent on the ability to estimate the 
capacity of others, which is necessary for assigning them to positions and for fixing their 
remunerations- the two fundamental problems of organization (Knight, 1921). So fundamental, 
to organized economic activity, is this paramount ability of the individual to estimate the 
capacity of others, that it will be discussed at length in the managerial implications section at 
the end of this paper.  
                                                                
62 It is undoubtedly so that if all changes occurred in an invariable fashion, they would be completely anticipated, and would not upset the 
uniformity of product values between the economic actors involved in the chain of production, and so prices and costs would pair. Profit only 
arises to the extent that a change and its consequences are unpredictable and so non-anticipatable in their nature.  
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In an uncertain world where individuals differ in their intelligence to form estimates, as 
well as in the degree of confidence they have in their estimates, the result is an economic system 
in which the confident and intrepid insure the doubtful and reluctant by guaranteeing them a 
contracted income in return for furnishing productive services under their managerial direction 
(Knight, 1921).63 However, this guarantee entails the bearing of uncertainty for the enterprising 
guarantor, that is, an “ultimate” responsibility for any error involved in the exercise of 
judgment or opinion. Where there exists such a liability of error, as a condition for resources 
falling under one’s direction, the individual is transformed into the entrepreneur. For the 
entrepreneur, who assumes true uncertainty by way of organized venture in the form of an 
enterprise in which they, by guaranteeing the value of their own judgement (estimates) to 
subordinates, bear ultimate responsibility, there is but one possible remuneration: the residuum.  
This residuum is profit, and it is what remains after payment is made, at competitively-
determined rates, to all claimants for all goods and services for which competition exists. 
Specifically, it is the difference between the market price the entrepreneur guarantees for 
productive services he employs- determined in a competitive bidding process with other 
entrepreneurs- and the market value of the output produced under his direction. This guaranteed 
market price for productive services is a wage, and is equal to the anticipated value of the 
laborer's (agent’s) specific contribution to the output.64 The propensity of entrepreneurs, as a 
group, to bid up wages for productive services is the main driver of their profits65 since their 
income is the residual after wages, imputed in the competitive bidding process, are paid out. 
The distinction between wages and profits is the distinction between risk and uncertainty.66 
                                                                
63 This guarantee is what Knight refers to as “ultimate responsibility”: the fact of assuming uncertainty. 
64 Any decision to enter into a contractual wage agreement involves an estimate, on the part of both parties, of the value of the contribution as 
well as of the market price of the final output to which a contribution would be made.  
65 It is of course clear that other important factors will be the diminishing returns from entrepreneurial ability as well as their proportion in 
size relative to non-entrepreneurs. 
66 And is also the distinction between perfect and actual competition. 
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A wage, or any economic rent, is a contribution residual; it is what is paid out after 
deductions are made for the contribution of other distributive shares of production.67 Profit, by 
contrast, is a margin-of-error residual, a miscalculation on the part of either the entrepreneurs, 
the agents, or both, in the wage-bidding process whereby the entrepreneur does not end up 
paying the competitive price that is fixed in advance of productive services being rendered. It 
is the imperfect knowledge of the future, a product of change, rather than change per se, that is 
necessary in explaining why profits arise.68 Specifically, the sheer fact that the results of human 
activity are inherently unpredictable, where any probability attributed to them is meaningless, 
is why profits arise. 
Proposition 1: For a firm, higher uncertainty is associated with a higher ROA 
Proposition 2: For a firm, higher uncertainty is associated with a higher ROE  
In the event that probabilities of outcomes are actually known, a definite return is 
imputed to the activity in question, but such definiteness is the hallmark characteristic of a 
wage, not a profit. And contractual wages do not involve ultimate responsibility and, by 
extension, the liability of error of judgement because they are paid out for services involving 
predictable routine tasks. Further, if outcomes were known, this wage compensation would be 
competitively determined, and therefore set exactly equal to the return of the economic 
undertaking, eliminating any profits from the undertaking. It should thus be evident to the 
reader that if the nature of risk was exclusively of a known calculation or probability, then there 
couldn’t be a return for risk-taking. That is because if the probabilities of gains or losses are in 
any way attainable, either mathematically or statistically, then risk could always be avoided by 
paying a fixed premium in exchange for insurance.69 70 In this case risk would not exert any 
                                                                
67 Contribution is specifically the marginal contribution of a productive unit multiplied by the number of units 
68 An anticipated change that does not materialize would have the same effect as an unanticipated change that materializes. It is not change 
that brings about profit, but rather that actual conditions deviate from those expected and on the basis of which business activity was arranged. 
69 Even in the event that the individual forgoes the insurance, this would then be no different than a gamble, securing a profit due to luck 
rather than from knowing the outcome. 
70 The insurance firm itself would not see profits either because if the probabilities are known, there would be a sufficient number of 
competing insurance firms such that the premium would be competitively set to the cost of providing them, eliminating profits. 
The profits of enterprise: Why and how risk and uncertainty compensate differently 
 
90 
 
considerable influence on the distribution of income (Knight, 1921) and the entrepreneur would 
cease to be an entrepreneur (Hawley, 1900). This point of no reward for a known risk will be 
reiterated again in arguing beta as a proxy for uncertainty in the next section.  
Proposition 3: For a firm, a higher risk is associated with a lower ROA   
Proposition 4: For a firm, a higher risk is associated with a lower ROE 
Beta as a proxy for true uncertainty 
Notwithstanding the common, and loose, labeling of beta as a ‘risk’, this paper argues 
that beta is the proper proxy uncertainty, in the way the term has been used in this paper and 
originally argued by Frank Knight. The financial metric beta (β) measures a special form of 
“risk”, one that is undiversifiable because it stems from general market movements rather 
than from idiosyncratic factors. It is the amount of incremental “risk” to an already-diversified 
portfolio. A market portfolio of all investable assets has a beta of exactly one. There are two 
reinforcing reasons by which this paper argues beta as a feasible proxy for true uncertainty. 
First, its relationship to the risk-free rate in the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).71 
Second, its relationship to Entropy in Information theory. 
In the CAPM model, beta is the only kind of risk for which investors should receive an 
expected return higher than the risk-free rate of interest (Fama, 1976). Beta’s relation to the 
risk-free rate is of great importance to the arguments of this paper. The risk-free rate of return 
is a theoretical rate of return of an investment containing absolutely zero risk. It has zero 
variance in returns, implying that it is uncorrelated with any other asset. Thus, when the risk-
free asset is combined with another asset, any change in the return is linearly related to the 
change in the risk as the ratio of the combinations change. To the investor, the risk-free rate is 
the minimum return they expect since no incremental risk is accepted unless the investment 
                                                                
71In the CAPM literature, beta is referred to as a “risk” but its definition is in fact the same as that which Knight termed “uncertainty”. This 
imprudent labeling of beta as a “risk” is symptomatic of the larger problem across literatures of interchangeably using the terms risk and 
uncertainty - the very problem Knight sought to tackle almost 100 years ago, and apparently to no great avail.  
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returns a rate higher than the risk-free rate. However, in reality, there is no such thing as a truly 
risk-free investment; even the safest of investments carries some amount of risk, however 
small. What is commonly used as a proxy for the risk-free rate is the three-month U.S. Treasury 
bill. That is because an investor can almost be certain that the US government will be solvent 
in 90 days in order to pay the interest on the bond. It is, for practical purposes, as close to 
absolute certainty as one can be in the financial markets. In the case of US T-bills, investors 
estimate with near certainty that the US government will respect its financial obligations in the 
future, and so the return one receives for assuming the risk of lending to it is correspondingly 
near zero. This characteristic is consistent with the arguments put forth in this paper: if risk is 
of a known probability, there could be no return for assuming it. Thus, it becomes apparent that 
another kind of “risk” must exist, one for which a return is in fact received; in the CAPM 
model, the return associated with this kind of “risk” is beta, which represents what this paper 
deems to be true uncertainty. 
Information theory provides another way of quantifying uncertainty: entropy, which 
measures the unpredictability of a particular state with respect to its information content 
(Mackowiak & Wiederholt, 2009). Viewing the problem from an information standpoint is 
particularly useful since, when maximizing objective functions, decision makers actively seek 
out information (Jensen and Meckling, 1992) but have limited cognitive ability to do so (Cyert 
& March, 1963; Simon, 1947). Thus, as per information theory, messages are communicated, 
between multiple parties, through a channel, over which, the message is modified. The receiver 
of the message must then infer which message has been transmitted. At its core, information 
theory quantifies information as a reduction in uncertainty, which is measured by entropy. 
Entropy is zero when the outcome is certain, and says nothing of the meaning behind the 
information, but rather only of the probability of observing an event.  
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The common link between beta and entropy is the correlation coefficients present in 
each of their equations. The basic reasoning is, as argued earlier in the paper, that correlations 
engender uncertainty because greater correlations impoverish predictability precisely because 
they increase the necessity of factoring in peripheral factors that influence the focal correlation. 
Due to diminishing returns on our mental capacity to consider factors, there is a limit on the 
number of correlations we can consider. Therefore, both metrics capture unpredictability, or 
uncertainty, through their correlation coefficients.  
From Mackowiak & Wiederholt (2009), the Entropy Equation72 can be written as  
 ({𝑋𝑡; 𝑌𝑡}) =  
1
2
𝑙𝑜𝑔2(
1
1−ρx |y
2  
)  where ρ2 is the correlation coefficient between variables 
𝑋𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑡. 
When the correlation coefficient ρx |y
2 = 0, we have 
 ({𝑋𝑡; 𝑌𝑡}) =   
1 
2
∗
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𝑙𝑛(2)
 =  
1
2
∗
 0
𝑙𝑛(2)
 =   0 
As such, when the correlation coefficient, ρ, between two processes (two variables) is 
zero, then entropy (i.e. uncertainty) is also zero. 
The beta of a portfolio can be expressed in terms of correlations and standard 
deviations 
β =𝜌𝑥,𝑦* 
 𝜎𝑦
𝜎𝑥
 
which is precisely how this this paper calculates beta for reasons elaborated on in the 
methodology section. 
Thus, as we have the correlation coefficient (ρ) in both beta and entropy, we can see 
how minimizing uncertainty would also mean a beta of zero; that is, zero correlation to the 
market. 
 
                                                                
72 Derivation provided upon request 
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Hypotheses 
Consistent with what has been argued throughout this paper thus far, the following is 
a summary of the propositions are put forth in this paper 
Proposition 1: A higher firm βeta is associated with a higher ROA             (supported)  
Proposition 2: A higher firm βeta is associated with a higher ROE     (not supported)  
Proposition 3: A higher risk (stock volatility) is associated with a lower ROA     (supported) 
Proposition 4: A higher risk (stock volatility) is associated with a lower ROE      (supported) 
In addition to the four main propositions of this paper, I test whether or not volatility of the 
uncertainty (i.e. correlations to the wider market) acts as a bonus compensation to investors. 
As such,  
Proposition 5: A higher market volatility is associated with a higher ROA     (not supported) 
Proposition 6: A higher market volatility is associated with a higher ROE        (not supported) 
Methodology 
I draw longitudinal data from the economy-wide S&P 500, covering the period of 
March 1994 to June 2017. The final sample size is 114 firms, with approximately 10,500 
observations. All regressions are done on quarterly data due to the fact that ROA and ROE are 
reported on a quarterly basis; betas are however calculated based on daily price data. The data 
has been pulled from Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, CRSP, Yahoo Finance, and S&P Capital 
IQ. For the regressions, a fixed-effects model, with cluster robust standard errors on firms 
(Models 1 & 2) is used. For robustness purposes, I conduct bootstrapping with 1000 iterations 
(Models 3 & 4) and then multiple imputation with 50 cases and 1000 iterations (Models 5 & 
6) as a further robustness check due to missing data, which is a natural occurrence with 
financial data and time horizons of this length. However, the data for the six models are always 
missing-completely-at-random (MCAR).  
 
The profits of enterprise: Why and how risk and uncertainty compensate differently 
 
94 
 
Dependent Variables 
Measurements of firm profitability include Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on 
Equity (ROE). ROA measures exactly how efficient a firm is in using its assets to generate 
earnings. ROE, by contrast, measures how much earnings are generated with shareholder 
money; in other words, how effective a firm is in turning invested cash into greater earnings. 
Both of these metrics are reported quarterly, therefore the regression analysis is done on 
quarterly data (although betas are calculated on the basis of daily data). 
• ROA= Net Income / Total Assets 
• ROE= Net Income / Shareholder Equity 
Main Independent Variable 
Beta. Betas are estimated as a function of the product of the three-month daily standard 
deviation (volatility) and the four-month three-day correlations. For correlations, three-day 
returns73 (ri,t
3d) are used to account for nonsynchronous trading (which only affects correlations), 
and a somewhat longer horizon because correlations move more slowly than volatilities 
(Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014). Daily data, rather than monthly data, was used for returns as the 
accuracy of covariance estimation improves with the sample frequency (Merton, 1980). Our 
estimated beta for security i is given by  
βi
TS = ρi,m* 
 σi
σm
 
Finally, to reduce the influence of outliers, I follow Vasicek (1973) and Elton, Gruber, 
Brown, and Goetzmann (2003) and shrink the time series estimate of beta toward the cross-
sectional mean as per the Bayesian shrinkage factor given by 
wi= 1 - σ𝑖,𝑇𝑆
2  / (σ𝑖,𝑇𝑆
2  + σ𝑖,𝑋𝑆
2 ) 
                                                                
73 ri,t
3d=∑ ln (1 + rt+k
i2
k=0  ) 
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where σ𝑖,𝑇𝑆
2  is the variance of the estimated beta for security i and σ𝑖,𝑋𝑆
2  is the cross-sectional 
variance of the betas.74  
Thus, beta is  β𝑖 = wi* βi
TS+(1-wi) ∗  βi
XS 
Secondary* and Control variables 75 
• Risk*. This is the proxied through what is traditionally been a proxy for risk: volatility. 
Specifically, the volatility of a firm’s stock returns since this is idiosyncratic to a firm and can 
always be reduced through diversification. Stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility have 
realized low returns (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, Zhang, 2006, 2009; Falkenstein, 1994). Idiosyncratic 
volatility is defined as the three-month standard deviation of beta-adjusted residual returns. 
Residual return = R−Rf−β(Rm−Rf). For simplicity, I set the risk-free rate (Rf) to zero. 
Therefore, the formula is reduced to R−β*Rm, where R is the stock price return and Rm is 
return of the benchmark. 76 
• Market Volatility* (mvol). Of the S&P 500 to account for the possibility that higher market 
volatility might push returns higher.  
• Firm Size. Fama and French (1992) demonstrate that the relationship between beta and returns 
becomes even flatter after controlling for firm size. 
• S&P 500 Level (spx). To account for the state of the economy or market. 
• Inflation (cpi). This is to account for potential effects of money illusion, and is equal to the one-
year US CPI inflation rate (Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014). 
• Market return (mreturn). This is the return on the S&P 500 to account for noise (Frazzini and 
Pedersen, 2014). 
• Stock return (sreturn). This is to account for momentum (Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014). 
                                                                
74 The shrinkage factor places more weight on the time series estimate with a lower variance or when there is large dispersion of betas in the 
cross section. Pooling across all firms, the shrinkage factor wi has a mean of 0.606 
75 Industry effects are not controlled for consistent with the findings of Asness et al. (2014) showing that industry bets are not drivers of the 
relationship between returns and beta. 
76 Previous research in management testing beta has made a crucial error in their empirical studies by not controlling for idiosyncratic risk 
which is inherently captured in the metric beta. Because of this, the authors were left wondering why there exists strong correlations between 
systematic and unsystematic risk (e.g. Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994; Miller & Bromiley, 1990). 
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Results 
Table 1. Correlation Matrix    
 
Table 2. Regression Results
 
 The findings are very interesting. A significant positive impact on ROA from increased 
uncertainty (beta) is found, but not for ROE. Furthermore, the results show that assuming any 
risk (proxied through standard deviation of stock return) harms profitability. Surprisingly, 
market volatility (mvol) does not act as a “bonus return” on top of the return earned for the 
magnitude of uncertainty (beta) in model 1 (but it does in the bootstrapped model 3). Overall, 
the results point to investors being punished for not diversifying (i.e. taking on more risk) and 
rewarded for assuming the uncertainty of doing so. As such, the results point to 1) the theory 
     sreturn    -0.0608   0.1851  -0.0370   0.0113  -0.0037   0.1190   0.2977   1.0000
     mreturn     0.0199   0.0841   0.0540   0.1570   0.1018   0.2384   1.0000
        mvol    -0.0265   0.4803  -0.0100   0.1872  -0.0267   1.0000
         spx    -0.0655  -0.2053   0.3087   0.8591   1.0000
         cpi    -0.0100  -0.2155   0.2645   1.0000
    firmsize    -0.0393  -0.2230   1.0000
        risk     0.2514   1.0000
 uncertainty     1.0000
                                                                                      
               uncert~y     risk firmsize      cpi      spx     mvol  mreturn  sreturn
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
t statistics in parentheses
                                                                                                            
N                   10523           10504           10523           10504           10716           10716   
                                                                                                            
                  (11.01)          (3.17)         (32.33)          (5.79)         (10.85)          (3.16)   
_cons               12.50***        26.08***        12.50***        26.08***        12.23***        25.43***
                   (0.17)         (-0.75)          (0.17)         (-0.66)          (0.00)         (-0.75)   
sreturn             0.426          -11.73           0.426          -11.73          0.0125          -11.74   
                   (2.03)          (2.43)          (1.93)          (2.43)          (2.09)          (2.32)   
mreturn             7.935**         57.63**         7.935*          57.63**         8.241**         56.20** 
                   (1.11)          (0.96)          (1.91)          (1.04)          (1.23)          (1.17)   
mvol                16.66           75.32           16.66*          75.32           17.95           91.04   
                   (0.84)          (1.91)          (2.12)          (4.04)          (0.81)          (1.98)   
spx              0.000308         0.00577*       0.000308**       0.00577***     0.000295         0.00591*  
                  (-4.56)         (-1.07)        (-13.38)         (-1.98)         (-4.42)         (-1.06)   
cpi               -0.0329***      -0.0439         -0.0329***      -0.0439**       -0.0316***      -0.0424   
                   (1.22)         (-0.06)          (4.87)         (-0.16)          (1.21)         (-0.10)   
firmsize       0.00000601    -0.000000971      0.00000601*** -0.000000971      0.00000573     -0.00000166   
                  (-3.82)         (-2.88)         (-6.50)         (-3.51)         (-3.69)         (-2.97)   
risk               -49.00***       -327.2***       -49.00***       -327.2***       -47.03***       -326.2***
                   (2.56)         (-0.12)          (4.64)         (-0.18)          (2.55)         (-0.14)   
uncertainty         1.018**        -0.267           1.018***       -0.267           1.006**        -0.303   
                                                                                                            
                      ROA             ROE          ROA_bs          ROE_bs          ROA_mi          ROE_mi   
                      (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)             (6)   
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of the firm’s predications- the necessity of owning assets in the face of economic 
contingencies- being consistent with greater profitability and 2) the need to distinguish between 
risk and true uncertainty as investors are compensated differently for assuming them. 
But the fact that, under uncertainty, there is a return to assets (ROA) but not to money 
(ROE) warrants further reflection. It would appear that the explanation lies in the very way in 
which this paper defined true uncertainty: the probability that diversified assets pooled within 
a firm suddenly becoming undiversified due to an exogenous shock. Investors receive a profit 
return for owning assets that risk becoming undiversified whereby what was once a wide scope 
of operations suddenly becomes near singular. In other words, investors are compensated not 
for diversifying but for the unknown “risk” of suddenly becoming undiversified.77 What is 
captured, by contrast, in ROE is how well money is making more money. It is apparent that 
money invested within a firm contains no property in of itself that would allow it to diversify 
or undiversify (unlike assets). Further, investors, as soon as they purchase a share in a firm, 
part ways with their money, and in return they gain ownership of the assets of the firm that 
entitle them to a claim on its residual profits. Thus, investors’ stake in a firm is not money but 
rather assets. When they later sell their shares they sell away their claim on the [future] residual 
profits returned from that asset and, in return, attain the market value for that claim on asset 
profits. It is at the moment they sell their shares, they realize any gains (or losses) associated 
with how well the firm used investor money to make more money (i.e. ROE performance). 
However, the investor, at the moment they sell their shares, is then no longer, by definition, an 
investor. An investor’s realization (of ROE performance) would of course not take place so 
long as the investor is still an investor in the firm; in other words, this performance realization 
is not captured by ROE. 
 
                                                                
77 Unknown risk is what is referred to as uncertainty in this paper and Knight (1921) 
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Discussion 
Uncertainty in the sociological and management literatures 
Although this paper has largely taken the economics view of uncertainty, it is 
worthwhile to highlight the views of other literatures on the subject. Edwards (1954) introduced 
economic theories to psychology, which spurred psychology research into choice-behavior 
(Rakow, 2010). Herbert Simon’s work on bounded rationality was very much about decisions 
under uncertainty, that is, acting on limited information. The psychology research has focused 
on both contexts: decisions made under situations of uncertainty (e.g. Gilovich et al., 2002; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) as well as under situations of risk (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
In the context of uncertainty, for example, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) argued that 
organizations facing uncertainty substitute probability assessments with ‘simpler judgmental 
operations. In the context of risk, by contrast, Kahneman & Tversky’s 1979 paper on prospect 
theory diverged from expected utility (Savage, 1954) and subjective expected utility (von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). However, prospect theory research still focused on decision 
making in conditions of risk (Camerer & Weber, 1991), and risk-based decision frameworks- 
in economics, organization theory, and organizational behavior- are increasingly viewed by 
researchers as being quite simplistic and unrealistic (Teece & Leih, 2016). 
In the management literature, uncertainty has been associated with a lack of information 
(Luo and Zhao, 2013) or a lack of clarity (Daft and Lengel, 1986) with respect to economic 
and commercial conditions. These can relate to technological uncertainty (Anderson and 
Tushman, 1990), policy uncertainty (Banerjee et al., 2018), or from both (Miller, 1993), where 
economic and socio-political factors are nearly indistinguishable (Boddewyn, 1988). 
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Summary 
In this paper I have sought to tackle the omission of a crucial distinction in the literature 
on the theory of the firm, hypothesizing that the distinction is necessary because of its 
implications for firm profitability and, by extension, for that of investors as well. In doing this, 
I first carefully delineated the fine, and often convoluted, difference between risk and true 
uncertainty. The argument centered on risk being situations in which outcomes are predictable 
and thus subject to elimination through the insurance principle, the pillar of diversification, 
while uncertainty were situations in which outcomes were unforeseeable such that any attempt 
at a real probability would be meaningless, and thus individuals must resort to innate ability to 
make estimates or form judgements. The possession of the crucial ability to form correct 
estimates or judgements is what separates the entrepreneur from the masses. For it is the 
entrepreneur who, gifted with intuition and brimming with confidence, dares to venture. They 
place the weight of ultimate responsibility on themselves by assuring others a guaranteed wage 
in return for control over productive services in a world characterized by unpredictability. As 
such, the entrepreneur is ultimately liable for decisions associated with the enterprise because 
their income, the profits, is the remainder after wages are paid out. Profits, or loss, is manifestly 
an outcome of uncertainty. It is by the same token that no profit, or loss, can arise for a 
responsibility where outcomes are certain, because the returns to such a “responsibility” are 
then competitively imputed into a wage that necessarily equipoises the returns to the economic 
undertaking, annihilating profits. The empirical results are consistent with this: investors are 
rewarded for the uncertainty built up in an effort to diversify away risk, rather than for taking 
on risk itself. 
Limitations and future research direction 
It will almost seemingly be inevitable that the question arises of whether or not Net 
Income, present in ROA and ROE, represents pure profit as described in this paper. It is of 
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course a practical impossibility to distinguish wages, or any rent, from pure profit. All actual 
income contains elements that are rent and elements that are pure profit. The presence of 
uncertainty, the condition on which various income sorts are differentiated in the first place, 
renders it impossible to truly say how much of any income is of one type or the other. However, 
we can take comfort in the fact that a negative relationship between risk (an economic 
undertaking with a predictable outcome) and ROA was found. As risk increases, wages would 
be bid upwards in order to deal with this economic undertaking, which, as argued earlier, is the 
chief factor that determines residual income, that is, profits. 
However, good proxies for pure profit can be established. Income derived from 
intangible or high-tech assets could be argued to be income derived from conditions of 
uncertainty. Argyres (1995) argued that technological uncertainty was akin to Knight’s concept 
of uncertainty and that it can arise when different agents may have different ideas about the 
underlying probability distribution of possible outcomes of various technical development 
paths. By contrast, income derived from routine assets (e.g. fees routinely earned on a deposit 
account) would involve almost no responsibility, and a decision was taken in that regard 
precisely because it was a sure one rather than venturesome or enterprising. 
Furthermore, the effect of uncertainty on the returns of short-term vs long-term assets 
would undoubtedly be of great extension to the research question at hand. Length of the 
production process is one of the two key determinants of uncertainty.78 As such, the inquiry 
into whether or not, and to what extent, uncertainty affects the returns on short versus long-
term assets would serve to further bolster the arguments made in this paper, or conversely, 
attenuate them. Whether it is a greater scope of activities or time, there is greater uncertainty 
due to the fact that estimates must then be made over more precarious lengths. Thus, one would 
                                                                
78 The other being the general level of economic wants of consumers. The more they are of staple goods, the easier they are to predict; the 
more they of are aesthetic, or impulse, goods, the harder they are to predict.  
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expect to find a stronger relationship between uncertainty (beta) and long-term asset returns 
versus the returns on shorter-term assets.  
Managerial implications 
The practical implications here for managers are especially important for ‘’without 
more precision in establishing the existence of environmental complexity and the means 
through which it impinges on an organization, the antecedents for theorizing internal dynamics 
are neither defined nor established empirically’’ (Wry et al., 2013). In the foregoing arguments 
of the paper, little effort was made to break away from the notion of the pure entrepreneur, 
that is, the entrepreneur who holds the dual role of ultimate responsibility (guaranteeing wages) 
and control (making judgement-based decisions). If the world consisted uniquely of pure 
entrepreneurs, it would be due to it being impossible to obtain knowledge of the abilities of 
others. For no one would place their resources under the control of another without a guarantee, 
and no one could become the entrepreneur without being able to guarantee this themselves.79 
However, the fact that individuals do form estimates, a form of knowledge 
procurement, of the ability of others means that they are not necessarily assumed to be 
unwilling to place their productive services under the control of others without receiving a 
guarantee of a fixed remuneration. To the extent that they are confident in their own ability to 
judge the ability of others, they go ahead and place their productive services under the control 
of a hired executive without such a guarantee, and consequently assume ultimate responsibility. 
As a result, it may seem that the transfer of the control function from investors to a hired 
executive, who in fact executes or does the “controlling”, means that the function of 
responsibility is alienable from the function of control. However, upon closer inspection, we 
will see that this can never truly be the case, and this inseparability has interesting and 
important implications for management. To see this, it becomes necessary to refer to the earlier 
                                                                
79 It goes without saying that similarly, due to this impossibility of obtaining knowledge of others, no third party would underwrite the 
guarantee. 
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notion from Knight (1921) that it is one’s judgement of people (and their ability to deal with 
situations) rather than of one’s judgement of situations that is most important within an 
organization. 
Thus, the type of knowledge on which responsibility and control depend is not the 
knowledge of situations and the means for dealing with them; it is the knowledge of others’ 
knowledge of such things. In an organized setting, the challenge of judging situations is 
therefore superseded by the more daunting challenge of judging the ability of others to estimate 
situations. As such, the locus of error is displaced from errors in the estimates of situations to 
errors in estimates of people themselves since organized control of nature depends less on 
knowing nature than it does on the possibility of knowing the accuracy of others’ knowledge 
of nature, and their capacity to use this knowledge (Knight, 1921). It becomes apparent that the 
principle modus operandi of control is to select the right person and delegate tasks to them. 
However, when control is accurately located within the organization, its inseparability from 
responsibility for its correctness will be evident. 
Consider the most monotonous of positions at the bottom of a hierarchy; most of their 
work would be mechanical and routine, but even such a position would occasionally deal with 
at least some uncertainty and, in such cases, the subordinate is forced to exercise an important 
judgment in whether to tackle the uncertain situation themselves or to appeal to their supervisor 
for guidance. The superior of course does not know, with certainty, the ability of their 
subordinate to do the job, and so exercises an even more important level of judgement when 
they assign the subordinate to this position and set their wage accordingly. As such, the 
outcome is that the uncertainty and responsibility the subordinate faces are effectively 
transferred to the superior, because the true uncertainty is the superior’s estimate of his 
subordinate’s ability to do the job. What happens, as a result, is that the subordinate’s function 
then becomes somewhat of a [“routine”] duty whereby they employ their best judgement but 
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leave the consequences to others higher up in the hierarchy. However, this upward pass-through 
of responsibility need not necessarily stop at this level of the hierarchy. The responsibility of 
this superior’s ability to judge the subordinate’s ability is further transferred up to his 
hierarchical manager in those cases that are even more extraordinary, or uncertain, than the 
ones that landed on the superior’s desk. The effect is that the uncertainty passes on to the 
manager who had hired and tasked the superior of the subordinate. It becomes clear that at the 
same time that selection of personnel and delegation of tasks work their way down the 
hierarchy, responsibility makes its way up the hierarchy, becoming more “ultimate” in nature, 
and this ascent continues in stepwise fashion until the uppermost echelons of the organization 
are reached. However, even the chief executive was placed in their position by someone, and 
so the responsibility for errors in her judgement is similarly further passed upwards to the board 
of directors that elected her, before finally reaching those who have ultimate responsibility: the 
investors. It is investors who have no task elected for them, but rather elect a board, and task it 
with electing a chief executive who is tasked with electing deputies and so on and so forth.  
The only "risk" which leads to a profit is a unique and true uncertainty stemming from an 
activity for which responsibility cannot be insured nor capitalized nor salaried (Knight, 1921). 
The members of a corporation have no ultimate responsibility at all; only the assets of the 
corporation are liable for the corporation's errors in judgements. This is consistent with the 
notion that the hired manager makes decisions but the enterpriser takes the consequences of 
decisions (Hawley, 1900). 
The principle of organized economic activity is in fact confronting uncertainty in 
individual judgments by grouping these judgements. This is the principle of insurance. The 
overall outcome, for the firm, can then be said to depend on a sort of "average" competency of 
all persons within the organization to perform their duties, where a cancelling-out of errors in 
judgements occurs across an individual’s decisions as well as across the decisions of all 
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employees. The determinants of the level of this “average” is set in motion from the very top 
when individuals make estimates of the capacity of their direct subordinate to do a job, and 
subsequently place them in that position and remunerate them accordingly. This sets the tone 
for the rest of the organization. It will in fact determine the threshold in quality of judgements 
before an inquiry is passed up the hierarchy; the higher the threshold, the better uncertainty is 
dealt with at lower levels of the hierarchy, which translates to greater profits for investors. It is 
thus manifest that the selection of individuals with the highest capacity to deal with unique 
situations represents one of the most important aspects of an organization.  
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Firms 
 
 
3M Company Avery Dennison Corporation Cincinnati Financial Corporation
Abbott Laboratories Ball Corporation Cintas Corporation
Aflac Incorporated Bank of America Corporation Cisco Systems Inc
Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. Baxter International Inc. Citigroup Inc.
Alliant Energy Corporation BB&T Corporation Coca-Cola Co/The
Altria Group, Inc. Becton, Dickinson and Company Colgate-Palmolive Company
American Express Company Best Buy Co Inc Comcast Corp
American International Group, Inc. Boeing Co/The Comerica Incorporated
AMETEK, Inc. Bristol-Myers Squibb Company Conagra Brands, Inc.
Amgen Inc. Cabot Oil & Gas Corporation Corning Incorporated
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation Cadence Design Systems, Inc. Costco Wholesale Corp
Analog Devices, Inc. Cardinal Health Inc CSX Corporation
Andeavor Caterpillar Inc. Cummins Inc.
Apache Corporation CenturyLink, Inc. CVS Health Corporation
Apple Inc. Chevron Corp Deere & Company
Applied Materials, Inc. Chevron Corporation Dover Corporation
Archer-Daniels-Midland Company Church & Dwight Co., Inc. Duke Energy Corporation
AT&T Inc. Cigna Corp Duke Realty Corporation
Automatic Data Processing, Inc. Cigna Corporation Edison International
Eli Lilly and Company Helmerich & Payne, Inc. Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings
Emerson Electric Co. Hess Corporation Leggett & Platt, Incorporated
EOG Resources, Inc. HollyFrontier Corporation Lockheed Martin Corp
EQT Corporation Home Depot Inc/The Lowe's Cos Inc
Eversource Energy Honeywell International Inc. Merck & Co Inc
Exxon Mobil Corporation Humana Inc. Microsoft Corp
Federal Realty Investment Trust Intel Corporation PepsiCo Inc
FedEx Corp International Business Machines CorporationPfize  Inc
Fifth Third Bancorp International Flavors & Fragrances Inc.Procter & Gamble Co/The
Flowserve Corporation International Paper Company Sysco Corp
FMC Corporation J.B. Hunt Transport Services, Inc. Target Corp
Ford Motor Co Jacobs Engineering Group Inc. Tyson Foods Inc
Franklin Resources, Inc. Johnson & Johnson United Technologies Corp
General Dynamics Corporation JPMorgan Chase & Co. UnitedHealth Group Inc
General Electric Company Kansas City Southern Valero Energy Corp
Genuine Parts Company Kellogg Company Verizon Communications Inc
Harley-Davidson, Inc. KeyCorp Wal-Mart Stores Inc
Hasbro, Inc. Kimberly-Clark Corporation Walt Disney Co/The
HCP, Inc. KLA-Tencor Corporation Wells Fargo & Co
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CHAPTER 5 : DISSERTATION CONCLUSION 
 
 
Overall, this dissertation project is concerned with uncertainty, resources and 
organizations. Although the first two papers focused on resource dependence theory and the 
third paper on the theory of profit, both theories thematized uncertainty prominently. In RDT, 
uncertainty brings about the necessity of assessing the complex external environment in order 
to manage dependencies, principally through resource control. In the theory of profit, 
uncertainty forces individuals to rely on estimates in making decisions, with those possessing 
superior intellect and confidence, in forming the estimates, securing resources. As such, both 
theories emphasize actors using assessments, or estimates, as a way of controlling resources to 
deal with uncertainty. However, both theories also recognize that environmental complexity 
introduces biases into these estimates and assessments. Thus, the chief limitation in dealing 
with uncertainty is human cognitive ability. 
Resource dependence theory states that those with superior estimates enable particular 
firm strategies that permit control of resources and power, which provides stability in outcomes. 
These strategies include restricting information flows, deflecting controversial actions onto 
others, shaping perceptions, organic growth, M&A, establishing ties to other organizations in 
order to coordinate, procure information or establish legitimacy and, finally, the use of political 
strategies to change or dismantle government regulations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
However, this dissertation project largely avoids detailed treatment of the aforementioned 
strategies of RDT. This is because the goal of the first two papers is not to simply restate what 
RDT has to say, which is mostly what research nowadays does with its ceremonial citations of 
Pfeffer and Salancik’s classic 1978 book (Wry et al., 2013). Rather, the goal of the first two 
papers is to add to the theory-development of RDT, which has been lacking and has resulted in 
a research exodus from the RDT tradition. 
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Similar to RDT, Knight’s theory of profit also predicts that those with superior estimates 
will control resources. Specifically, in an uncertain world where individuals differ in their 
intelligence to form estimates, as well as in the degree of confidence they have in their 
estimates, the result is an economic system in which the confident and intrepid insure the 
doubtful and reluctant by guaranteeing them a contracted income in return for furnishing 
productive resources under their managerial control. To deal with uncertainty, this enterprising 
individual, with superior estimates, will then engage in many ventures such that they spread 
their estimates over a large number of undertakings in order to secure stability in their overall 
outcomes. 
Rather than exhaustive analysis, humans mostly act on estimates because the future 
depends on a sufficiently large number of factors and so no reasonable effort is made to consider 
all of them. In order to simplify complex webs of relationships, the numerous and relatively 
less important factors of a situation are discarded in order to obtain laws or principles in a 
general sense. Thus, humans tackle uncertainty intelligently because these laws and principles 
are approximately true and are adeptly discounted on the basis of their incompleteness (Knight, 
1921).1 
This dissertation project detailed three ramifications of firms handling uncertainty 
through resources: 1) subsidiary power decline, 2) greater subunit focus on external power 
dynamics, and 3) reward for uncertainty but not risk. The first paper theorized the decline of 
subsidiary power as the subunit externally embedded into its local environment and its 
resources became increasingly context-specific, or idiosyncratic. This idiosyncrasy is driven by 
knowledge-based factors such as casual ambiguity, absorptive capacity, and arduous 
relationships. The second paper argued that in order to understand empirical findings of 
subsidiaries allowing knowledge transfer declines, it was necessary to parse subsidiary power 
                                                          
1 Discounting the incompleteness of laws or principles is the same notion as being able to judge the accuracy of one’s estimates.  
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into internal and external power whose interplay (i.e. correlation) determines how much 
bargaining power, vis-à-vis the HQ, can be leveraged. The main point was that the subunit 
increasingly focuses on external power dynamics in order to secure resources over which the 
HQ faces inherent problems in exercising ownership rights. The third paper argued that 
uncertainty and risk are concepts that need to be distinguished from one another because they 
compensate differently. While risk was argued to be a routinely [diversifiable] hazard for which 
no reward can thus arise, uncertainty was argued to be a unique hazard that is not subject to 
routine diversification, and therefore a reward is gained for the superior ability to confront it. 
The first paper synthesized the literature on sticky knowledge transfer with RDT, 
linking them through their arguments on internal embeddedness. As sticky knowledge becomes 
more acute with increased subsidiary external embeddedness, the focal subunit reduces 
interactions with sister subunits- a necessary interaction in RDT for subsidiary power within an 
MNC. Thus, this paper was centrally about the tradeoffs between internal and external 
embeddedness, which preclude the emergence of a single all-powerful firm. To the extent that 
a subsidiary can transfer back, to the MNC, the competencies it developed locally, RDT predicts 
the subsidiary becoming more critical, more influential and thus more powerful within the MNC 
(Tavani et al., 2014). However, as its criticality declines due to acuteness in sticky knowledge 
transfer (e.g. causal ambiguity, absorptive capacity, arduous relationships), paper 1 argued that, 
per RDT, so too does the subsidiary’s ability to influence MNC corporate objectives. In other 
words, the subunit’s power declines because power is dependent on criticality2 which is 
dependent on being able to transfer those unique resources to the MNC in the first place. If a 
subsidiary is no longer able to transfer critical knowledge back to the MNC because said 
knowledge has become too relationship-specific, then the subsidiary itself becomes less critical 
to the MNC since the MNC would come to depend less on the focal unit for its survival. 
                                                          
2 That is, being central within the MNC (structural embeddedness) and possessing unique resources the MNC needs (relational 
embeddedness). 
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Therefore, the focal subunit’s power within the MNC would begin to wane- a prediction that is 
consistent with the core tenets of RDT. Lastly, paper 1’s conceptualization raised the intriguing 
question of why a subsidiary would allow its knowledge transfers to the MNC to decline if this 
is a main source of its power within the MNC.  
Naturally, paper 2 then explored the intriguing phenomenon of subsidiaries allowing 
critical knowledge transfers to their MNCs, a power source, to decline. The paper depicted 
subsidiary and HQ decisions as a function of their utilities, providing novel insights into drivers 
of MNC power dynamics. This was done by building a conceptual model that captures the 
presence of opposing utility functions between the focal subunit and HQ, which represent the 
occurrence of goal incongruences. Subsidiary embeddedness decisions were argued to be a 
function of power accrued in both the external and internal markets, with the subunit focused 
on maximizing total power, not just internal power. The existing literature has thus far 
exclusively, and unwarrantedly, focused on internal power.  
Paper 2’s central argument was that a subunit derives greater utility from focusing on 
external power dynamics relative to internal power dynamics because external relationships 
secure a path to resources over which the HQ does not possess fiat power. From there, the 
paper’s model then showed that only when actors’ utility functions increase in opposing 
directions does bargaining power materialize and become relevant, which led to the paper’s 
most counterintuitive insight: the HQ seeks to minimize its bargaining power, which is 
tantamount to eliminating subsidiary rent-seeking. The paper’s model also captures how 
correlations between the internal and external markets impact the subunit’s ability to maximize 
its bargaining power- consistent with management and economic argumentation (i.a. Nell and 
Andersson, 2012; Tadelis and Williamson, 2012). 
The conceptualizations in paper 2 provided researchers with a more holistic and accurate 
way of using RDT to examine strategic decisions made by subsidiaries and HQs, decisions 
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which have ramifications for the resource configuration and balance of power within firms. 
Further, in synthesizing management and economic theories, the paper also responded to a 
critical need for more visualizations that capture power dynamics (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 
2008). 
Paper 3 kept with the central theme of the dissertation project- uncertainty, resources 
and organizations- but rather than employ RDT, it used Knight’s classic theory of profit to 
problematize the contemporary lack of a proper distinction between risk and uncertainty in the 
literature on the theory of the firm (although this void is rampant across most literatures today). 
The problem is tackled is from the standpoint of the ‘problem of profit’, and any satisfactory 
elucidation of the problem must clear up the nature of the distinction between perfect 
competition and actual competition, since the critical distinction between the two is the absence 
of profit. The answer to this problem is to be found in a thorough examination of the concept 
of uncertainty, and its bearings upon economic processes, when it is present and when it is 
absent; but uncertainty must be understood in a sense radically different from the familiar 
notion of risk (Knight, 1921).  
Knight argued that dealing with uncertainty through grouping, to secure outcome 
continuity, constitutes a strong incentive to extend the scale of operations of a business 
establishment in order to generate greater economies. However, the chief limitation on this was 
the cognitive capacity of its business’ leadership (Knight, 1921). In fact, there is an associated 
hazard that is just as pervasive as the opportunity to secure economies: that the world will 
suddenly change and strand the very investments designed to exploit continuity, leaving the 
firm evolutionarily vulnerable (Winter, 2017). Paper 3 thus argued that while diversification 
reduces variance, it comes with the latent liability of higher correlations to the wider market. 
Specifically, as a firm eliminates risk through diversification into the wider economy, it builds 
up [true] uncertainty through exposure to increasingly opaque correlations dispersed throughout 
Dissertation Conclusion 
114 
 
the economy. These opaque correlations escape the cognitive abilities of its management and 
are, as such, not subject to elimination. However, it is also precisely and uniquely due to 
uncertainty that profits materialize because unanticipated changes cause an imbalance between 
costs and price, which would otherwise be paired through competitive forces that, when 
unhindered, erase profits nearly as fast as they are created.  
To operationalize uncertainty, the paper used beta, arguing the justification based on the 
CAPM model and information theory. The findings of paper 3 showed a significant positive 
impact on ROA from increased uncertainty (beta), but none on ROE. Furthermore, the results 
showed that assuming any risk (standard deviation of stock return) harms profitability. Overall, 
the results point to investors being punished for not diversifying (i.e. taking on more risk) and 
rewarded for assuming the uncertainty of diversifying in order to avoid risk. As such, the results 
point to 1) the theory of the firm’s predications- owning assets in the face of economic 
contingencies- being consistent with greater profitability and 2) the need to distinguish between 
risk and uncertainty, as investors are compensated differently for assuming them. 
Overall, organizations, including their subunits, handle uncertainty through resource 
diversification, but this strategy is limited by the cognitive abilities of the decision-makers. In 
this dissertation, the cognitive limitation resulted in tradeoffs, faced by firms, in each of the 
three papers. In the first paper, the tradeoff was between internal and external embeddedness 
where the ramification was subsidiary power decline. In the second paper, the tradeoff was 
between internal power and external power where the ramification was goal incongruences 
between the focal subunit and the HQ.3 In the third paper, the tradeoff was between risk and 
uncertainty, where the ramification was a penalty of risk-bearing but a reward for uncertainty-
bearing.  
                                                          
3 That is, the focal subunit placed more emphasis on external relations than internal ones. 
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In this closing paragraph the dissertation project can be holistically summed up as 
follows. The individual who is confident and venturesome transforms herself into the 
entrepreneur by guaranteeing, to those who are doubtful and reluctant, a fixed remuneration in 
return for their productive resources falling under her managerial direction. This guaranteed 
remuneration to others is the bearing of uncertainty, that is, the liability to err in managing the 
dependencies arising from an unpredictable external environment. The entrepreneur then 
employs her superior ability to form estimates, based on past experiences, in order to understand 
complex relations within the environment. In light of her assessments, she consolidates her risks 
through diversification whereby she absorbs assets and expands the scope of her operations. 
This allows her to spread her judgements over a larger number of ventures, which provides 
stability and predictability in the outcomes of her business activities. She relies on being correct 
on average; that is, although some of her ventures will be spectacular failures involving large 
losses (e.g. over-embeddedness), a larger proportion of them will rather be relatively 
unprofitable and she will rely on making her [residual] gains from the occasional large 
successes. That is, sometimes she wins and sometimes she loses in her bargaining with other 
economic actors (e.g. contrast figures 6 & 7 of paper two). But she counts on the long-run value 
of her estimates in dealing with uncertainties arising from the conflicting and impinging 
demands of the complex environment she faces, which includes governments, competitors, 
suppliers, producers, laborers and customers. Nevertheless, at the end of the day, she is 
ultimately responsible for things not going according to plan: for unanticipated changes 
occurring or anticipated changes failing to occur. She carries the full burden of the uncertainty 
that has been built up as a result of her diversifying into a larger scope of activities across the 
wider market. The extent of this burden of uncertainty is a function of the accuracy in her 
estimates, and she is only as accurate in her estimates as she is limited in her cognitive ability 
to procure knowledge. 
